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CORPORATE  CRIMINAL  MINDS
Mihailis E. Diamantis*
ABSTRACT
In order to commit the vast majority of crimes, corporations must, in some sense, have
mental states.  Lawmakers and scholars assume that factfinders need fundamentally different
procedures for attributing mental states to corporations and individuals.  As a result, they saddle
themselves with unjustifiable theories of mental state attribution, like respondeat superior, that
produce results wholly at odds with all the major theories of the objectives of criminal law.
This Article draws on recent findings in cognitive science to develop a new, comprehensive
approach to corporate mens rea that would better allow corporate criminal law to fulfill its deter-
rent, retributive, and expressive aims.  It does this by letting factfinders attribute mental states to
corporations at trial as they ordinarily do to similar groups out of the courtroom.  Under this new
approach, factfinders would be asked to treat corporate defendants much like natural person
defendants.  Rather than atomize corporations into individual employees, factfinders would view
them holistically.  Then, factfinders could do just what they do for natural people—in light of
surrounding circumstances and other corporate acts, infer what mental state most likely accom-
panied the act at issue.  Such a theory harmonizes with recent cognitive scientific findings on
mental state and responsibility attribution, developments that corporate liability scholars have
mostly ignored.
INTRODUCTION
American criminal law adopted the fiction that corporations are people
so it could hold them accountable for wrongdoing.1  But it left the project
© 2016 Mihailis E. Diamantis.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.  Written while an Associate-
in-Law at Columbia Law School.  I owe special thanks to Professors Robert Ferguson, Kent
Greenawalt, Philip Hamburger, Bernard Harcourt, Joshua Kleinfeld, Jody Kraus, James
Lindgren, Michele Papa, Daniel Richman, Paul Robinson, Scott Shapiro, and Amy
Sepinwall, for helpful comments and encouragement.  Thanks are also due to Anthony
Deardurff, Lee Lieberman Otis, Tom Sprankling, and the participants in the Columbia
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1 See Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 329–30 (1883);
18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1811 (2016) (“[P]rivate corporations may commit almost
every kind of a tort and be held liable, and this liability may be enforced in the same
manner as if the wrong had been committed by an individual.”); 19 C.J.S. Corporations
§ 816 (2012) (“Corporations generally are regarded as ‘persons,’ within the meaning of
statutes which make certain acts by ‘persons’ [a criminal] offense.”); Mark M. Hager, Bodies
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incomplete.  Though crimes typically require an actus reus and a mens rea,2
courts have no real theory of how corporations, which have no bodies or
minds, could instantiate either.3  The best they have is an antiquated gim-
mick—respondeat superior—for holding corporations vicariously responsi-
ble for the crimes of their employees.4  That approach may have the benefit
of making courts somewhat consistent in deciding when to hold corporations
accountable.  But even that lone virtue is now threatened as respondeat supe-
rior, at this stage in corporate history, increasingly produces outcomes at
odds with any sensible notion of criminal justice.
Sometimes respondeat superior lets patently criminal corporations off
the hook.  This could be because, in complex and opaque organizations, the
paper trail may be too long and incomplete to find individuals who commit-
ted crimes attributable to the corporation.5  Or it could be because there
Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational ‘Real Entity’ Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 585
(1989).
2 See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (“In the criminal law, both
a culpable mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to
occur.”).
3 See, e.g., David H. Kistenbroker et al., Corporate Motive and Time Warner: Smoke and
Mirrors Revisited, in PRACTISING L. INST., SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE
2003, at 125, 129 (Jay B. Kasner & Bruce G. Vanyo eds., 2003) (“Corporations may legally
be people, but they are also legal fictions and only natural persons can possess states of
mind.”).
4 See 18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1822 (2016).
5 See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads
and U.S. Att’ys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-
corps.PDF (“It will often be difficult to determine which individual took which action on
behalf of the corporation.  Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared among
operating divisions or departments, and records and personnel may be spread throughout
the United States or even among several countries.  Where the criminal conduct continued
over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may have been
promoted, transferred, or fired, or they may have quit or retired.”); BRANDON GARRETT,
TOO BIG TO JAIL 113 (2014) (“[I]t can be hard to hold employees responsible.”).  There
are numerous examples.  In 2010, Barclays entered into a deferred prosecution agreement
with prosecutors in which it admits to having violated U.S. sanctions by trading with enemy
states.  Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 19, United States v. Barclays Bank PLC, No.
1:10-cr-00218-EGS (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/BarclaysBankDPA.pdf.  The judge expressed disbelief that that no individuals
were being prosecuted, to which the prosecutor replied, “In every case . . . we look. . . .  But
in this case, there . . . was not someone who we could prove to a court beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . had committed an offense.”  Hearing at 5–6, United States v. Barclays Bank PLC,
No. 1:10-cr-002180-EGS (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2010).  Similarly, after investigating General
Motors for over a year, prosecutors entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in
which the company admitted it hid fatal ignition switch flaws in its vehicles.  Press Release,
U.S. Att’y’s Office S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges Against
General Motors and Deferred Prosecution Agreement with $900 Million Forfeiture (Sept.
17, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-crimi-
nal-charges-against-general-motors-and-deferred.  To critics seeking individual liability, the
prosecutor replied, “Criminal intent can be hard to prove.  But if there is a case to bring,
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literally is no individual employee who did anything proscribed by law. For
example, in one case, a ferry capsized after setting sail with her bow doors
open, killing nearly 200 passengers.6  From top to bottom, the corporation
that ran the vessel “was infected with the disease of sloppiness.”7  Prosecutors
brought manslaughter charges against the corporation, but no individual
employee was so sloppy as to have been grossly negligent, the required mens
rea.8  Applying respondeat superior, the court found the corporation not
guilty.9
Other times, respondeat superior exposes a corporation to criminal
charges despite the overwhelming sense that the true criminal is not the cor-
poration but some rogue employee within its ranks.10  In United States v. Sun-
Diamond Growers of California,11 a corporation’s in-house lobbyist defrauded
the corporation in order to make illegal payments to politicians who were his
friends.12  Since the lobbyist could have been acting “also, with an intent
(however befuddled) to further the interests of his employer,” the court
upheld charges against the corporation.13  Though, in the court’s opinion,
the corporation “look[ed] more like a victim than a perpetrator,” it felt its
hands were bound to uphold the conviction by prevailing doctrine and a
poor exercise of prosecutorial discretion.14  Even if one is not moved by the
particular facts in Sun-Diamond, rogue employees are a pervasive concern.15
we’ll bring it.”  Drew Harwell, Why General Motors’ $900 Million Fine for a Deadly Defect Is Just
a Slap on the Wrist, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
business/wp/2015/09/17/why-general-motors-900-million-fine-for-a-deadly-defect-is-just-a-
slap-on-the-wrist/.
6 R. v. Her Majesty’s Coroner for E. Kent, (1987) 3 B.C.C. 636, 638 (Eng.).
7 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Id. at 640.
9 Id.
10 Contemplating such charges has been explicit Department of Justice policy. See,
e.g., Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys, Regarding
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/
2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf (“In all cases involving wrongdoing by
corporate agents, prosecutors should consider the corporation, as well as the responsible
individuals, as potential criminal targets.”).
11 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
12 Id. at 970.
13 Id. at 970–71, 974.
14 Id. at 970 (“Where there is adequate evidence for imputation (as here), the only
thing that keeps deceived corporations from being indicted [is] . . . simply the sound
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”).  For a similar example, see Pevely Dairy Co. v. United
States, 178 F.2d 363, 370–71 (8th Cir. 1949), which reversed a corporate conviction for
antitrust violations because all individual defendants had been acquitted.
15 See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 65 (2007) (“[A] mul-
tinational corporation may theoretically be indicted, convicted, and perhaps put out of
business based on the alleged criminal activity of a single, low-level, rogue employee who
was acting without the knowledge of any executive or director, in violation of well-publi-
cized procedures, practices, and instructions of the company.”); Steven D. Feldman, Win-
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Such scenarios are unavoidable in the current world of massive, dispersed,
international corporations, regardless of how robust internal compliance
mechanisms may be.16  Judges and laypeople alike share the palpable sense
of inappropriateness at criminally condemning corporations due to the acts
of rogue employees, even when the facts are not so sympathetic.17
Cases such as these undermine the most basic goals of criminal law, and
may even have ripple effects that compromise criminal law outside of the
corporate context.  There is no successor theory of corporate liability poised
to take the reins, and nothing satisfactory floating in academic literature.18
Some proposals, like Peter French’s “internal decision structure” model,19
rest on naı¨ve understandings of how complex corporations actually operate.
Others, like the “collective knowledge doctrine” advanced by judges20 in
some jurisdictions, only exacerbate the problems of respondeat superior.
Against this stark background, this Article takes a first step toward a solu-
tion by providing a comprehensive theory for adjudicating corporate mental
states.  Previous scholarship has been limited by the tacit assumption that
triers of fact must use fundamentally different procedures for attributing
mental states to individuals and corporations.  But a substantial and growing
body of cognitive science research indicates that people ordinarily use the
same psychological mechanisms whether assessing the mental lives of individ-
uals or of groups like corporations.  An elegant solution to the problem of
corporate mens rea, and the one proposed by this Article, would accept what
ning Strategies and Challenging Trends for White Collar Defense Attorneys, in MANAGING WHITE
COLLAR LEGAL ISSUES (ASPATORE 2014), 2014 WL 6629527, at *7 (“There is now more will-
ingness to go after corporations for the bad acts of rogue employees.”); Joseph W. Martini
& Karen Mignone, Minimizing Client Exposure to Criminal Enforcement for Environmental Viola-
tions, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 27, 30 (2004) (“In many instances, internal investigations
will reveal that the conduct that prompted [environmental] agency intervention involved
the unauthorized acts of a ‘rogue’ employee.”).
16 See Joan McPhee, Corporate Criminal Liability and Punishment in the 21st Century: Depar-
tures from Constitutional and Criminal Norms and Anomalies in Practice, 16 NO. 4 ANDREWS’
PROF. LIAB. LITIG. REP. 13, *5 (2006) (“[T]he confluence of these two developments today
allows for the isolated act of a single low-level employee—acting contrary to company pol-
icy, without knowledge or participation by senior management, and in the face of diligent
efforts by corporate management to prevent commission of the conduct in issue—to sub-
ject the entire company to the threat of extraordinarily punitive sanctions.”); Irwin
Schwartz, Toward Improving the Law and Policy of Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 51
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 112 (2014) (“No organization—private or government—can prevent
all misconduct by all employees, all of the time.”).
17 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater & John Schwartz, Enron’s Many Strands: The Deliberations;
Jurors Tell of Emotional Days in a Small Room, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2002), http://www.
nytimes.com/2002/06/17/us/enron-s-many-strands-deliberations-jurors-tell-emotional-
days-small-room.html (“‘They just forced us to come back with a guilty verdict,’ said juror
Wanda McKay . . . . ‘One person did one thing and tore the whole company down.’”).
18 See infra Part III.
19 PETER FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987).
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people naturally do and build the requirements for mens rea around that
understanding.
The Article begins by recounting how corporate criminal law ended up
in its current predicament, a story intimately bound up with the history of
respondeat superior and the evolution of the modern corporation.  The Arti-
cle next motivates the effort to keep a place for corporate mens rea in crimi-
nal law, despite how seemingly bizarre the concept may be.  It argues that
some requirement of corporate mens rea must remain if criminal law is to
fulfill its central functions.  The Article then raises, only to set aside, alternate
theories of corporate mental states.
Turning to its positive argument, the Article asks first whether there
really is a unique problem for adjudicating corporate mental states, and con-
cludes that courts face similar problems with the mental states of natural per-
son defendants.  Drawing on this key observation, the Article proposes
further anthropomorphizing corporations in the eyes of the law, and adjudi-
cating their mental states just as courts do those of natural persons—infer-
ence to the best explanation from acts and surrounding circumstances.  The
resulting theory harmonizes with recent discoveries in cognitive science and
social psychology about how people actually assess the blameworthiness of
groups like corporations.
This Article proceeds from relatively open-ended starting premises.  It
makes no assumptions about the “real” nature of corporations or the best
theory of corporate actus reus.  In the early twentieth century, theorists
debated whether corporations are just groups of people or actually constitute
distinct entities separate from their members.21  But, by focusing on how
people perceive corporations, rather than on the nature of corporations
themselves, this Article sidesteps that debate entirely.  Similarly, though this
Article assumes that there is some sensible theory of corporate actus reus—a
way of resolving when a corporation has done something and what—nothing
will turn on the details of that theory.22
I. THE UNMAKING OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Corporate criminal law developed its primary theory of liability at a time
when corporations looked very different than they do today.  Corporations
began as limited entities23 in twelfth-century England.24  In colonial
21 See Hager, supra note 1, at 579–80; see generally Eric Colvin, Corporate Personality and
Criminal Liability, 6 CRIM. L.F. 1, 1–2 (1995).
22 Readers should feel free to press on with their favorite theory of corporate action in
mind.  And one must have such a theory if one is to think the whole concept of incorpora-
tion makes any sense. Cf. Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of
the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 38 (1957)
(“[A] corporation must of course be able to act . . . else the whole theory of incorporation
would make no sense whatsoever.”).
23 See Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence
to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523,
531–32 (2010).
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America, the actions they could take were severely restricted, and could never
include anything not specified in their corporate charters.25  In line with
longstanding British law,26 a corporation was not liable for so-called “ultra
vires acts” because, being beyond the powers conferred by its corporate char-
ter, the corporation literally could not do them.27  From Blackstone’s time28
and well into the twentieth century,29 the very possibility of disembodied and
mindless corporate crime left theorists nonplussed.30
Around the time of the Civil War, American courts began utilizing doc-
trines of vicarious liability as a legal band-aid for the problem posed by ultra
vires acts in the civil context.31  Specifically, courts introduced the doctrine
of respondeat superior,32 according to which corporations are civilly liable
for the acts of their “employees while acting within the scope of their employ-
ment.”33  Courts at the time regarded respondeat superior as a matter of
“public policy and convenience” rather than a logical consequence of the
nature of corporations.34
24 Harvey M. Silets & Susan W. Brenner, The Demise of Rehabilitation: Sentencing Reform
and the Sanctioning of Organizational Criminality, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 332 (1986); see also
JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY 12 (2003).
25 See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 673 (2012); Rubin, supra note 23, at 531–32.
26 See Albert J. Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corporation and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires,
35 YALE L.J. 13, 23–24 (1925); see also Pulton v. London & S.W. Ry. Co., [1867] 2 LRQB
534, 540 (Eng.).
27 See Hager, supra note 1, at 592–94.
28 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476 (“A corporation cannot commit . . .
crime[ ] in its corporate capacity.”).
29 See, e.g., Paul Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 602–03 (1924).
30 See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 8:21 (3d ed. 2015) (“The early cases declared that a corporation could not commit a
crime for want of the requisite mens rea or intent.”); see also Case 935, (1701) 88 Eng. Rep.
1518 (KB) (“A corporation is not indictable, but the particular members of it are.”); BLACK-
STONE, supra note 28 (“A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in
its corporate capacity though its members may, in their distinct individual capacities.”).
31 E.g., Phila., Wilmington & Balt. R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 209–10
(1859); Nims v. Mt. Hermon Boys’ Sch., 35 N.E. 776, 777–78 (Mass. 1893); see JOHN W.
SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS 57–58 (3d ed. 1910); Hager, supra note 1, at 594–95; Rubin,
supra note 23, at 540–42.
32 See, e.g., The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 30–31 (1881); Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v.
Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 486–87 (1852).
33 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
34 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909)
(“[There is] no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corpora-
tion . . . shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents
to whom it has intrusted authority to act.”); Phila. & Reading R.R. Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) at
479 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 452 (6th ed. 1863));
Goodspeed v. E. Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530, 536, 542–44 (1853); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.07, at 147 (AM. LAW INST.,Tentative Draft No. 4, 1968); Mueller, supra note 22, at 28
(“The law has developed the concept of corporate criminal liability without rhyme or rea-
son, proceeding by a hit and miss method, unsupported by economic or sociological
data.”).
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The development of vicarious criminal liability was a slower, piecemeal
process35 that progressed by way of analogy to tort law.36  Corporations were
first held liable for failures to act.37  Later, corporations were charged with
affirmative criminal conduct, so long as the offense did not have a mental
state element.38  It was not until the early twentieth century that prosecutors
indicted corporations for guilty mental state crimes with any regularity.39
The delay was no doubt occasioned by concerns such as that voiced by Lord
Chancellor Edward Thurlow (1731–1806): “Corporations have neither bod-
ies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned, they therefore do as they
like.”40  In recognizing corporate crime, U.S. courts led the charge,41 adopt-
ing respondeat superior for this purpose, more out of convenience than
thoughtful reflection42 (though, perhaps to avoid potential due process con-
cerns with vicarious criminal liability,43 the doctrine was not always refer-
enced by name).44
35 See generally COX & HAZEN, supra note 30.  Common law courts led the way; by the
mid-twentieth century, most civil law countries stuck to the maxim that societas delinquere
non potest, or “a corporation can do no wrong.”  Mueller, supra note 22, at 28–35.
36 Mueller, supra note 22, at 39.
37 See, e.g., Queen v. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry. Co., (1842) 3 Q.B. 223, 114 Eng.
Rep. 492, 496.
38 See, e.g., Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 75 P. 924 (Colo. 1904).
39 See, e.g., Hudson River R.R., 212 U.S. at 494–96; see also COX & HAZEN, supra note 30
(“Until the twentieth century, only on rare occasion did a court hold a corporation liable
for commission of a ‘true crime,’ that is, a crime in which a mens rea was an essential
element.”).
40 See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 24, at 33.
41 European courts did not impose criminal liability on corporations until recent
decades. See Gunter Heine, New Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability in Europe: Can
Europeans Learn from the American Experience—or Vice Versa?, 1998 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANS-
ATLANTIC L.J. 173, 174.
42 See generally COX & HAZEN, supra note 30; see also Overland Cotton, 74 P. at 926; 18B
AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1812 (2016).
43 I do not mean to claim that there actually are due process problems inherent in
vicarious criminal liability, especially where an entity is concerned.  But courts generally
seem to be sensitive to potential conflicts between vicarious liability and due process. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law.”); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961) (“In our
jurisprudence guilt is personal.”); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1103 (5th Cir.
1976) (“[H]olding one vicariously liable for the criminal acts of another may raise obvious
due process objections.”). See generally Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Consti-
tutional Dimensions of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2008).
44 Courts have been less comfortable with the notion of vicarious criminal liability, so
respondeat superior officially remains, at least in name, primarily a doctrine of civil liabil-
ity. See Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 111 (1893) (“[W]here it
has been held that [a principal can be held liable for the criminal libel of his agent], it is
admitted to be an anomaly in the criminal law.”); Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 468, 479 (1852). But see United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121,
125 (1958) (“[I]t is elementary that such impersonal entities can be guilty of ‘knowing’ or
‘willful’ violations of regulatory statutes through the doctrine of respondeat superior.”);
The Hiram, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 440, 446–47 (1861).
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Corporations have changed dramatically in the two centuries since the
introduction of respondeat superior.  They were unbound from their restric-
tive state charters and became the flexible business entities they are today.  In
1819, the Supreme Court decided that corporations possessed several private
rights, thereby preventing states from arbitrarily rewriting corporate charters
to keep them in check.45  Shortly after, states independently began shedding
limitations on corporations to attract business, even allowing them to incor-
porate without a state charter.46
Also, the number, size, and complexity of corporations have grown.47
Before the late eighteenth century, business corporations were rare in the
United States; the South had none until 1781.48  Compare that to the ubiq-
uity of the corporate form in modern America.  Until relatively recently,
though there were some economic giants like the Dutch East India Com-
pany, most business enterprises fit in single-family homes.49  By the late nine-
teenth century, only a handful of U.S. corporations had a net worth of over
$10 million.50  But the twentieth century saw the creation of corporations
with previously undreamt wealth and complexity.51  It issued in the devel-
oped stock market, complex chains of authority, and the separation between
ownership and control.52
In the early context of small, closely held, and relatively simple corpora-
tions, respondeat superior may have served well enough as a rule for deter-
mining corporate criminal liability.  It did not answer the theoretical
question of how mindless entities can commit crimes that require particular
mental states,53 or settle possible due process concerns raised by vicarious
criminal liability.  But it at least provided a relatively consistent answer in the
vast majority of cases—just find out what one of the few employees running
the corporation intended, and that is what the corporation intended too.
The approach may have seemed intuitive enough when large areas of respon-
45 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 571 (1819); MICK-
LETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 24, at 45.
46 See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 24, at 45–46, 68–69. R
47 See Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (1979) [hereinafter Corporate Crime] (“The
twentieth century has witnessed a tremendous explosion in the number and size of
corporations.”).
48 See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 24, at 43–44.
49 See id. at 20–21.  Indeed, England stuck largely to the simple family-run model well
into the last century. See id. at 82 (“Family-run firms had no need for the detailed organiza-
tion charts and manuals that had become commonplace in large American companies.”).
50 See Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities,
1887–1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 109 (1955).
51 See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 24, at 58–59 (2003) (discussing Sears
Roebuck).
52 See id. at 87, 104.
53 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 782 (2012).  (“[B]eing a de jure person, [a corporation]
cannot by itself have a mental state of any kind . . . .” (quoting La. Power & Light Co. v.
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 803 (E.D. La. 1986))); id. § 783 (“A corpora-
tion has no mind, and thus, cannot, per se, be adjudged to have committed a willful act.”).
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sibility for corporate activity could be traced to single employees or the own-
ers themselves.
Whatever intuitive appeal respondeat superior may have had, its utility is
increasingly limited at this stage in corporate history.  The modern corporate
behemoth operates with such diffused responsibility and decentralized deci-
sionmaking that it is at times impossible to identify which employees
approved or acquiesced in illicit conduct, often because no such employee
exists.54  Even where channels of authority and reporting responsibility are
well-defined (and they often are not!), each employee’s contribution to what
amounted to an illicit act may be so compartmental and miniscule that none
could have thought or done anything objectionable.55  In those cases where
prosecutors can pin criminal conduct to an individual employee, there is no
guarantee that attributing the crime to the corporation will comport with the
basic commitments of criminal justice.56  The employee may, for all respon-
deat superior cares, be a rogue in an otherwise upstanding corporate citi-
54 See, Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olaza´bal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 113.
55 See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) (recog-
nizing that corporations are “[c]omplex business structures, characterized by [the] decen-
tralization and delegation of authority”); COX & HAZEN, supra note 30; Abril & Olaza´bal,
supra note 54, at 106–10; Michael L. Benson et al., District Attorneys and Corporate Crime:
Surveying the Prosecutorial Gatekeepers, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 505, 507, 511–12 (1988) (reporting
from a survey of district attorneys in California that the difficulty of pinpointing individual
intent discourages them from filing charges against corporations); Kathleen F. Brickey,
Model Penal Code Conference Transcript—Discussion Two, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 635 (1988)
(“[I]t’s going to be impossible in many instances to find a single culpable individual.”);
Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49
BUS. L. 617, 625 (1944) (“Given the often complex and decentralized nature of many cor-
porations, it is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, to prove that any single corporate
agent acted with the necessary intent and knowledge to commit an offense.”); Victor H.
Kramer, Comment, Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of a Policy,
48 GEO. L.J. 530, 540 (1960) (“[R]esponsibility in the modern corporation is diffused
among so many executives that it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix personal responsibility
for the corporation’s crime.”).
56 Corporate Crime, supra note 47, at 1243 (“[G]enerally the criminal acts of a modern
corporation result not from the isolated activity of a single agent, but from the complex
interactions of many agents in a bureaucratic setting.  Illegal conduct by a corporation is
the consequence of corporate processes such as standard operating procedures and hierar-
chical decisionmaking.”).  This amorphous and organic picture of corporate decisionmak-
ing is confirmed by longstanding models of decisionmaking in complex organizations. See
GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION 32–33 (1971); JOHN G. MARCH & HERBERT A.
SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 157–90 (1958); Ann Foerschler, Comment, Corporate Criminal
Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1300–02
(1990).
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zen.57  If courts use respondeat superior in such scenarios,58 the end result is
a verdict that undermines fundamental goals of criminal law.59
II. IS CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAW WORTH THE EFFORT?
This Article aims to provide an intuitive and workable theory of corpo-
rate mens rea to replace respondeat superior.  Any substitute should cater to
the basic objectives and tools of corporate criminal law.  There is some disa-
greement about what precisely those objectives are.  Some academics, partic-
ularly those who would scrap corporate criminal law entirely, have a
mistakenly narrow understanding of what corporate criminal law is up to and
how it can achieve its goals.  A brief detour to engage these academics will
clarify the diverse ends a successful theory of corporate mens rea should
serve.
The fact that the American people, through their legislatures, have
determined that mens rea requirements for corporate crime are desirable60
should be enough to justify the effort.  Without a new theory, the corporate
criminal system will remain theoretically unjustified and increasingly self-
undermining.  A replacement theory need not imply that corporations actu-
ally have mental states61—corporations are, after all, only fictional persons.
However, since nearly all crimes have a mental state element,62 adjudicators
must have some way of attributing mental states to corporations if corpora-
57 See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
58 18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1821 (2016) (“It must still be determined which indi-
vidual within the corporate structure had the intent to commit the crime . . . .”); id. § 1815
(“[T]he requisite state of mind must necessarily be that of [the corporation’s] employee or
agent.”).
59 The arguments below focus on criminal law’s expressive goals.  But respondeat
superior often also undermines criminal law’s deterrent aim. See Irina Sivachenko, Corpo-
rate Victims of ‘Victimless Crime’: How the FCPA’s Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability,
Hurts Businesses and Discourages Compliance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 393, 396–97, (2013) (“[T]oday
there is little a corporation can do to avoid prosecution for the unauthorized acts of its
employees . . . . In turn, such helplessness leads to an undesired and unexpected result: a
significant drop in a corporation’s incentive to vigorously monitor its own compliance and
conduct.”).  Others have criticized respondeat superior for generating incentives for cor-
porations to gather insufficient information and to close channels of communication
between employees, see, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The
Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 377–82 (1999), abandoning the crucial
notion of culpability in criminal law, see, e.g., William S. Laufer, Culpability and the Sentenc-
ing of Corporations, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1049, 1078–90 (1992), and imposing inefficient levels of
liability on corporations, see Mueller, supra note 22, at 40–41.
60 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 39 (2015) (“Strict criminal liability statutes remain the
exception in our criminal law system, not the rule, and have a generally disfavored
status.”).
61 See, e.g., OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 22–30, 66–85 (F.W.
Maitland trans., 1st ed. 1900) (describing Middle Age German views on the collective con-
sciousness of corporations).
62 See supra note 60.
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tions are ever to be liable for most crimes.63  As this Article argues, a mecha-
nism that can fulfill this role is available in human social-cognitive
architecture and could readily be integrated into criminal procedure.
Yet some academics with a more revisionary mindset are not convinced
that corporate criminal law is worth the trouble.  A few have argued for aban-
doning traditional corporate crime altogether in favor of purely civil liability
or a regime of strict liability.64  These theorists take as their starting point an
anemic view of the purposes served by the criminal law and of the remedies
potentially available against corporations.  They assume, for example, that
“optimal deterrence”65 is the sole aim of criminal punishment66 and that
“money damages”67 is the only sanction it can dispense.  In doing so, they
effectively conceive of the corporate criminal system as a tort regime with
procedural inefficiencies68 and inflexible sanctions.69  It should come as no
surprise that corporate criminal law would make for a poor tort regime.
Ultimately, the question of whether to retain corporate criminal law may
be purely academic.  Corporate criminal law is growing here and among
Western nations,70 and the political will to reverse this trend is nowhere in
sight.71  Even if academic, the question itself is worth asking.  Corporations,
after all, are fictitious persons, so there is some choice in whether to treat
them as such for purposes of criminal law.  Consequentialist considerations
of social utility should guide the inquiry.  Still, when viewed in all its richness,
63 This Article is not the first to search for a theory of corporate liability that could be
implemented without uprooting current criminal law. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Corporate
Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 669–70 (1994).
64 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319,
319 (1996) (“We argue that there is no need for corporate criminal liability in a legal
system with appropriate civil remedies . . . .”); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability:
What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996).
65 Khanna, supra note 64, at 1497.
66 See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
366, 396 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (“General prevention ought to be the chief end of
punishment, as it is its real justification.”).
67 Fischel & Sykes, supra note 64, at 320.
68 See id. at 332 (arguing that the higher standard of proof in criminal procedure is
less efficient than the tort standard).
69 See id. at 331 (arguing that, unlike criminal sanctions, tort sanctions can be cali-
brated to the social costs of illegal corporate activity).
70 Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1481, 1482 (2009) (“[A] comparative review reveals something that may come as a
surprise: in other countries, the focus in the past several decades has been on the creation
of corporate criminal liability in jurisdictions in which it did not exist, and where such
liability already existed the modern reforms included modifications intended to make it
easier, rather than harder, to prosecute corporations criminally.”).
71 Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 577, 612 (2012) (“[C]orporate
punishment is not likely to yield to corporate regulation any time soon.  The public has
increasingly registered greater moral outrage in response to corporate governance scan-
dals.  Moral outrage, in turn, fuels retributive motivations and therefore supports those
institutions best poised to take advantage of such motivations.”).
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corporate criminal law as it stands today has a vital, socially useful role to play
that civil or strict liability alone cannot.
A. The Diverse Purposes of Criminal Law
The ends served by criminal law extend beyond deterrence.  Other com-
monly accepted aims include rehabilitation, incapacitation, and desert.72  As
the Model Penal Code’s list of purposes attests,73 deterrence is just part of
the story, even for corporations.  Were it otherwise, one would expect the
scope of traditional corporate criminal law to recede over time, replaced by
the efficient strict civil liability standards that deterrence-focused, law-and-
economics theorists often favor.74  In fact, precisely the opposite is occurring
as the breadth of corporate criminal law expands both here and abroad.75
Desert is the most conspicuously absent aim in analyses favoring purely
strict or civil liability regimes.76  Though desert may “no longer [be] the
dominant objective of criminal law,”77 the Supreme Court recognizes it as a
legitimate consideration for legislatures passing criminal statutes.78  Legisla-
tures and courts generally show a default concern for desert by specifying or
inferring79 intent requirements in statutes.80  Adjudicators also appear to be
sensitive to considerations of desert in sentencing corporations.81  Desert
72 Corporate Crime, supra note 47, at 1231; see also Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liabil-
ity and the Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2010) (“[Corpo-
rate criminal law is t]he legal equivalent of one-stop shopping, it promises consequential,
retributive and expressive benefits, all at the same time.”); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 350–51
(1996) (“The idea that a single normative theory does or should determine the shape of all
criminal doctrines is exceedingly implausible.”).
73 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1985) (including classic retributive
aims among “the general purposes of the provisions [on] sentencing”).
74 See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 64, at 330 (“The analysis in the preceding sec-
tions suggests that corporations should bear liability for corporate crimes . . . .”); see also
Corporate Crime, supra note 47, at 1237, 1243–44 (“Standards which require no finding of
wrongful intent or carelessness may effectively deter illegal behavior but do not comport
with the moral principle of just deserts [i.e., retribution].”).
75 See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING § 1.9.2, at 52–55 (1994);
Khanna, supra note 64, at 1477.
76 Meir Dan-Cohen, Sanctioning Corporations, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 22 (2010) (“The justi-
fication of punishment on this account is an interplay between deterrence and retribution
[and this justification enjoys considerable support].”).
77 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
78 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that
retribution is neither “a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent with our respect for the
dignity of men”).
79 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (noting that there is “an
interpretive presumption that mens rea is required” by criminal statutes).
80 Corporate Crime, supra note 47, at 1241; see id. at 1238; see, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 6.02 (2015) (“Requirement of Culpability.”).
81 See Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Trends in Corporate Crime and Punishment, 3 FED. SENT’G
REP. 121, 123 (1990) (“In the few [corporate crime] cases where there were multiple
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remains a vibrant feature of our criminal law82 that cannot be sidelined by
scholarly fiat.
Desert will strike some as flatly inapplicable to corporations.83  To an
extent, they are right.  But desert is an entrenched feature of our corporate
criminal law,84 so there must be some sense to it.  It is important to distin-
guish between two possible desert-sensitive aims.85  The classic desert theory
comes from Immanuel Kant.86  According to it, in a deep metaphysical sense,
justice requires the punishment of wrongdoers.87  So strong is this mandate
that “[e]ven if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself . . . the last Murderer
lying in prison ought to be executed [beforehand].”88  Whatever plausibility
this theory has, it derives from the unique moral nature of human beings.
The theory does not translate well for corporations, which do not have the
same sort of moral standing.89
defendants as well as differing degrees of culpability, sanctions were generally based on the
level of culpability.”).
82 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (including classic retributive
aims among “the general purposes of the provisions [on] sentencing”).
83 See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1392 (2009) (“[A]ttributing blame to a corporation is no more
sensible than attributing blame to a dagger, a fountain pen, a Chevrolet, or any other
instrumentality of crime.”); John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Fed-
eral Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 350 (2004) (“Corporations neither deserve nor
attract our sympathy. . . . [A]s such they do not deserve sympathy simply because they are
not human.  For that reason alone, they should not be the subjects of criminal prosecu-
tion.”). But see Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 832
(1927).
84 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMM’N 2015) (reflecting a particular concern for “just punishment” in the sen-
tencing of corporations, in addition to “adequate deterrence”).
85 See Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 833, 842–43 (2000).
86 IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (John Ladd trans., 1999).
There are other less mystical approaches to classical retributivism that may be more amena-
ble to the corporate context.  Herbert Morris, for example, sees retribution as righting the
imbalance of burdens and benefits that a criminal upsets by violating the social contract.
HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33–34 (1976) (“Justice—that is punishing
[criminals]—restores the equilibrium of social contract benefits and burdens . . . .”).  But
this sort of approach to classical retributivism has been persuasively refuted as a possible
aim or justification of criminal law. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973).
87 IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 49E (Mary Gregor trans., 1991); IMMAN-
UEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 196 (W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1887)
(“[T]he undeserved evil which any one commits on another, is to be regarded as perpe-
trated on himself.”); see Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS 179 (F. Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Retributivism is the view that
punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it.” (emphasis
omitted)).
88 KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 87, at 198.
89 See Friedman, supra note 85, at 845 (“So far as pure Kantian retribution is con-
cerned, the critics of corporate criminal liability may well be correct . . . . This theory
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The second approach to desert justifies criminal punishment by its
expressive significance.90  Some scholars speak more broadly about the
“expressive function of [all] law,” but the values implicated are clearest in the
criminal context.91  According to these expressive theories,92 criminal pun-
ishment “conveys society’s authoritative moral condemnation” and “reaffirms
its commitment to the values that the wrongdoer’s own act denies.”93
Though there has been a recent resurgence of interest in similar theories,
they have been around for centuries.94  Joel Feinberg, in his classic essay on
the subject decades ago, observed that “[criminal] [p]unishment is a conven-
tional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation,
and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation.”95  It allows the commu-
nity on whose behalf the punishment is meted out to disavow the criminal
act, reflecting the common sense “idea that in failing to punish wicked acts
society endorses them and thus becomes particeps criminis.”96
assumes a certain conception of the wrongdoer . . . .”); see also Corporate Crime, supra note
47, at 1241 (“For an individual defendant, the mental state with which he committed the
illegal act determines his moral culpability.  But mental state has no meaning when applied
to a corporate defendant . . . .”).
90 See generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397
(1965).
91 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024,
2044–45 (1996) (“The criminal law is a prime arena for the expressive function of
law . . . .”).
92 Also known as “social cohesion theories.” See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 104 (9th ed. 2012).
93 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 72, at 352; see Friedman, supra note 85, at 843
(“Criminal liability in turn expresses the community’s condemnation of the wrongdoer’s
conduct by emphasizing the standards for appropriate behavior—that is, the standards by
which persons and goods properly should be valued.”); Peter J. Henning, Corporate Crimi-
nal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1426 (2009) (“The
label ‘criminal’ has a social significance aside from the particular punishment imposed on
the offender.”).  Some commentators argue that, in addition to its moral message, criminal
punishment conveys “political, cultural, racial and ideological messages.”  Bernard E. Har-
court, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship Between The Moral
Limits of the Criminal Law and The Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 145, 168 (2001).
94 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 235 (1968) (“[Some] mod-
ern retributive theory has shifted the emphasis . . . to the value of the authoritative expres-
sion, in the form of punishment, of moral condemnation for the moral wickedness
involved in the offense.”); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN
ENGLAND 81–82 (1883) (“[T]he infliction of punishment by law gives definite expression
and a solemn ratification and justification to the hatred which is excited by the commission
of the offense.”).
95 Feinberg, supra note 90, at 400.
96 Id. at 404–08.
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Expressive theories can apply to defendants that do not have the same
moral nature as individual humans.97  Defendants need only be identifiable
entities capable of socially perceptible, purposeful activity.98  Thus, as E´mile
Durkheim notes, punishment achieves its expressive purpose not “by virtue
of some mystic strength or other,” but by “giv[ing] voice to the unanimous
aversion that the crime continues to evoke, and this by an official act.”99  No
one doubts that corporations are purposeful entities, typically pursuing
profit;100 as discussed later,101 cognitive scientists now know people naturally
perceive corporations in this way.  Through criminal punishment, the com-
munity can express its stance on conflicts between, for example, profit-seek-
ing and fundamental individual and social rights.102
When theorists who prefer civil to criminal liability do consider the
expressive component of criminal law, they fail to appreciate the uniquely
condemnatory (toward the criminal) and affirming (toward the victim) mes-
sage behind criminal conviction.103  Placed in the mix among generic con-
97 Friedman, supra note 85, at 845–46 (“Expressive theory accordingly entails a rela-
tively ‘thin’ conception of the wrongdoer, . . . an identity upon which the community’s
judgment can be focused in a meaningful way.”).
98 See Baer, supra note 72, at 4–5 (“We can credibly blame the financial institution
known as ‘Goldman Sachs’ because we believe, on multiple levels, that Goldman Sachs is
an identifiable entity.”).  Friedman disserves his case for corporate criminal liability when
he argues that corporations must also be able to “express attitudes toward particular per-
sons or goods.”  Friedman, supra note 85, at 845.  Purposeful conduct is a lower and suffi-
cient threshold, and one that corporations can much more easily clear.
99 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND SOCIETY 62–63 (W.D. Halls trans.,
1984).
100 18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1825 (2016) (discussing “the corporation’s nature as
an economically motivated entity”); Corporate Crime, supra note 47, at 1235 (“[C]orporate
activity is normally undertaken in order to reap some economic benefit . . . .”).
101 See infra Section IV.B.
102 Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
609, 618–19 (1998) (“Just as crimes by natural persons denigrate societal values, so do
corporate crimes.  Members of the public show that they feel this way, for example, when
they complain that corporations put profits ahead of the interests of workers, consumers,
or the environment.  Punishing corporations, just like punishing natural persons, is also
understood to be the right way for society to repudiate the false valuations that their crimes
express.  Criminal liability ‘sends the message’ that people matter more than profits and
reaffirms the value of those who were sacrificed to ‘corporate greed.’”); id. at 621 (“To the
extent that criminal liability more effectively expresses public condemnation than does
civil liability, criminal punishments can be expected to be more effective in instilling aver-
sions to crime.”).
103 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 85, at 854–55 (“Civil and criminal liability have dis-
tinct social meanings . . . . [T]he finding of [criminal] liability must recognize that . . . the
victim or object’s value is beyond price.”); Khanna, supra note 64, at 1532 (“[S]ending the
[condemnatory] message through corporate criminal proceedings costs society more than
sending the message through civil liability . . . .”).  The law and economics literature on
retribution in corporate criminal law also has not taken into account Gabriel Markoff’s
recent empirical work demonstrating that the stigmatizing effects of corporate prosecution
are often grossly over exaggerated. See generally Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the
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tract and unintentional tort awards, the expressive force of this message
would weaken,104 if not change entirely.105  And in losing the ability to send
this message, society would lose something valuable.106
Even conceding that corporations have what Meir Dan-Cohen calls
“practical personality,”107 could criminal law integrate this insight “behind
the scenes” without explicitly requiring any kind of corporate mens rea as an
element?  Such a strict liability approach to corporate crime108 would also
undermine criminal law’s expressive aims.  Expressions of condemnation tar-
get wrongdoing, not just injury.109  To identify wrongdoing, adjudicators
must look behind the fact of injury to the mental states that brought it
about.110  There is all the difference in the world between mistaking some-
one else’s bag for one’s own and stealing it, even though the injury caused is
identical.111  A practice that treats both the same cannot “reaffirm[ ] [soci-
ety’s] commitment to the values that [only the thief’s] act denies.”112
B. The Diverse Sanctions Available in Corporate Criminal Law
Scholars who favor strict or civil liability for corporations often assume
that, because corporations cannot be imprisoned, the only criminal sanctions
Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797 (2013).
104 Kahan, supra note 102, at 619 (“[L]ike fines, civil damages seem to connote that
society is ‘pricing’ corporate crime.”).
105 See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 1373 (“Someone who applies this word [‘criminal’]
to objects and entities that are not blameworthy uses the label falsely.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (“What distin-
guishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it . . . is the judgment of
community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”); see also
Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 525
(2006) (“[C]riminal legal process[ ] adds unique and strong communicative force to any
societal conclusion about institutional fault.”).
106 Kahan, supra note 102, at 619–20 (“The public demands moral condemnation of
criminal wrongdoers, whether natural persons or corporations; when the law satisfies that
demand, it creates social welfare . . . . [P]eople do take satisfaction in this institution.”);
Ved P. Nanda, Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is a New Approach Warranted?,
in CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK 63, 64 (Mark Pieth
& Radha Ivory eds., 2011).
107 DANIEL DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 43, 58 (1987); Dan-Cohen, supra note
76, at 24–27; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). But
see Kahan, supra note 102, at 615–17 (arguing that shaming and expressive punishments
may be as efficient as monetary punishments).
108 See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 64.
109 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *27 (“[P]unishments are . . . only inflicted for the
abuse of that free will, which God has given to man . . . .”).
110 Bertram F. Malle, The Social and Moral Cognition of Group Agents, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 95,
100 (2010) (“It appears that people share a folk concept of intentionality and spontane-
ously use it to judge behaviors.”).
111 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 72, at 351–52.
112 Id. at 352.
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available against them are fines.113  But courts have some latitude in tailoring
sanctions to the corporate context, so long as the result is reasonably based
on differences between individuals and corporations.114  Imprisonment
aside, many of the punishments available for individual defendants are also
available against corporations.  The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, for example,
explicitly provide for orders of restitution,115 remedial orders,116 community
service,117 notice to victims,118 publicity of the offense,119 and probation.120
Courts have also imposed debarment and suspension, and ordered corpora-
tions to publish letters of apology.121
Foreign law presents still other possibilities.  In addition to fines,
France122 alone allows for dissolution,123 bans on professional or social activi-
ties,124 periods of judicial supervision,125 closure of establishments operated
by the corporation,126 exclusion from the marketplace,127 and bans on pub-
lic offering.128  Italian corporate criminal law adds various forms of “disquali-
fication” to the mix, including prohibition of activity related to the offense,
revocation of licenses, and prohibitions on contracting with the govern-
113 This was perhaps true of American law in the past. See 18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporations
§ 1826 (2016) (“A corporation may be punished by fine; indeed, the only punishment that
can be inflicted on a corporation for a criminal offense is a fine or seizure of its property
which can be levied by an execution issued by the court.” (citing N.Y. Cent. & Hudson
River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909))).
114 See Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Missouri ex rel. Jones, 238 U.S. 41, 55–56 (1915)
(“[C]orporations may not arbitrarily be selected in order to be subjected to a burden to
which individuals would as appropriately be subject.  Classification must be reasona-
ble . . . .”); Tarlton v. State, 93 S.W.3d 168, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“[A] statute
imposing a different punishment for individuals than for corporations did not violate
equal protection because a corporation cannot be imprisoned.” (citing Ex Parte Walsh, 129
S.W. 118, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910))); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.51 (2015)
(setting equivalencies between imprisonment and fines for corporations).
115 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
116 Id. § 8B1.2.
117 Id. § 8B1.3.
118 Id. § 8B1.4.
119 Id. § 8D1.4; see generally Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punish-
ment by Publicity under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2387 (1992).
120 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015); see
generally Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate
Offenders Through Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1988).
121 See Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice
in the Federal Courts, 1988–1990, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247, 265–66 (1991).
122 See generally Leonard Orland & Charles Cachera, Corporate Crime and Punishment in
France: Criminal Responsibility of Legal Entities (Personnes Morales) under the New French Criminal
Code (Nouveau Code Penal), 11 CONN. J. INT’L L. 111 (1995).
123 CODE PE´NAL [C. PE´N.] [PENAL CODE] art. 131-39(1), no. 1 (Fr.).
124 Id. at no. 2.
125 Id. at no. 3.
126 Id. at no. 4.
127 Id. at no. 5.
128 Id. at no. 6.
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ment.129  The availability of multiple sanctions does not disprove the argu-
ment for a purely civil or strict regime of corporate liability, but it does at
least show that the argument needs to be much more sophisticated than any
currently in the literature.
It is worth noting that some of the most significant penalties that corpo-
rate defendants face after conviction are technically not criminal sanctions at
all.  Collateral civil penalties that follow conviction, such as suspension and
debarment, can often impact a corporation far more than criminal fines.130
Not all available sanctions are socially productive, and these civil collateral
consequences may be particularly suspect.131  The point here is simply that
courts’ tool chest of corporate sanctions is richer than often supposed.
C. Other Reasons to Make Current Corporate Criminal Law Work
This Article presents no principled objection to developing an entirely
novel system of corporate liability.  But such a project, even if it adequately
fulfills the diverse aims of criminal law, would face significant practical, theo-
retical, and legal hurdles.  To begin, the system would represent a major
overhaul of our criminal law.  Even if Congress or state legislatures turned
their attention to the project, there is no reason to expect there would be
consensus on how to go about it.  In short, such reform would likely be a long
way off.  A new theory of corporate mens rea that could be plugged into the
current framework of criminal liability would do the trick.
Furthermore, not just any overhaul of the regime of corporate criminal
liability would work.  For example, replacing criminal standards with tort-like
standards would merely pass the buck.  Whether turning to intentional torts
or torts of negligence, desire and belief132 or attention and judgment133
pose the same problem: How can adjudicators attribute corporate mental
states when respondeat superior does not work?134  Of course, tort law does
129 Legge 8 giugno 2001, n.231, G.U. June 19, 2001, n.140, art. 9(2) (It.).  Spanish law
overlaps with Italian and French law. See C.P., B.O.E. n.281, art. 129, Nov. 24, 1995
(Spain); Melanie Ramkissoon, Country Report: Spain, in EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPO-
RATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 310, 313–14 (James Gobert & Ana-Maria Pascal eds., 2011).
130 See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND PREVENTION ch. 13
(2015); Beale, supra note 70, at 1500 (“[T]he conviction of a corporation often triggers
collateral consequences that have a far greater impact than any criminal penalties that may
be imposed.”).
131 See Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Back Against the Wall: Corporate Deferred Prosecu-
tion Through the Lens of Contract “Policing”, 23 CRIM. JUST. 34 (2008).
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The word ‘intent’ is
used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain
to result from it.”).
133 Id. § 283 cmt. b (“The words ‘reasonable man’ denote a person exercising those
qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its
members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of others.”).
134 It is also not clear whether a negligence regime for assessing corporate crimes
would make good policy. See Thomas A. Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of
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allow for strict liability in some cases.135  But, as argued above, it is doubtful
that strict liability rules can fulfill the important expressive purposes of crimi-
nal law.136  Moreover, corporations enjoy many of the same constitutional
protections as individuals,137 including equal protection.138  Any effort to
create a completely separate system of corporate criminal liability with only
strict liability offenses may have to contend with some as-yet-unaddressed
constitutional hurdles.139
III. AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES TO RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
This Article is not the first to try to remedy the shortcomings of respon-
deat superior,140 and other scholars have proposed alternatives.  However,
their theories suffer from one or more of the following disqualifying limita-
tions:141 they apply only to a limited class of mental states, they exacerbate
the problems of respondeat superior, and they often presuppose an antece-
dent, unarticulated theory of corporate mens rea.  Understanding the short-
Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210, 242–43 (1997)
(“If criminal liability for intentional offenses were extended by Congress in widespread
fashion to corporations for mere negligent behavior or less, corporations with a desire to
follow the law would have to implement massive and unwieldy preventative measures to
ensure as much.”).
135 Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“Strict liability most often applies
either to ultrahazardous activities or in products-liability cases.”).
136 See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976) (argu-
ing that desert is the only legitimate end of criminal law); KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS,
supra note 87, § 49E (“Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to pro-
mote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all
cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime.”); Pamela H.
Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1095, 1099–100 (1991) (“This blurring [of criminal and civil liability] dilutes the impact of
a criminal conviction, and, ultimately, erodes the power of the criminal law.” (footnote
omitted)); Laufer, supra note 59, at 1078–90 (arguing that law and economics approaches
to corporate criminal liability leave out important retributive elements at the heart of crim-
inal law).
137 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340–43 (2010)
(free speech); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (Fourth Amend-
ment); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (double jeopardy);
United States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 1971) (trial by jury).
138 See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 536 (1933) (“Corporations are as much
entitled to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as
are natural persons.”); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125
U.S. 181, 189 (1888); Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
139 See also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978). But see also
Khanna, supra note 59.
140 See Buell, supra note 105, at 520 (“[A]lmost no one has defended respondeat supe-
rior as the right liability rule.”).
141 The criticisms below reference, but do not detail, arguments about the policy impli-
cations of the theories.  This is partly because that terrain is already well-trod, but largely
because the discussion can turn to policy implications only after a conceptually coherent
apparatus for determining mens rea is on the table.
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comings of the theories considered below will bring into focus the features a
theory of corporate mens rea should have.
A. The Inner Circle
The Model Penal Code offers an approach according to which a corpo-
ration is liable when “the commission of the offense was authorized . . . by the
board of directors or by a high managerial agent.”142  The driving intuition
behind this view, which also reflects the position currently taken by English
courts,143 is that the offensive act must somehow have issued from the
“brain” of the corporation.144  By equating corporate officers with the corpo-
rate nerve center, the inner circle approach does not hold a corporation
liable for the acts of low-level “rogue” employees and provides a stopper to
some of the overbreadth of respondeat superior.
But the inner circle approach only exacerbates the underinclusiveness of
respondeat superior.  It presumes that those in the inner circle are suffi-
ciently informed about and in control of the operations of the corporation.
In today’s mega corporation, characterized by diffusion of responsibility and
authority, this simply is not true, or possible.145  Even where there are chan-
nels of communication designed to keep the upper echelon informed, these
channels can devolve organically, without the direction or reckless disregard
of any overseer.146  Their degradation results from countless decisions by
individuals throughout the corporate hierarchy, influenced by factors such as
their (mis)understanding of their job responsibilities, good or bad interper-
sonal relationships, forgetfulness, and a desire to protect themselves (or
those above or below them).147  Because the inner circle are uninformed
about and uninvolved in the day-to-day activities of a corporation, where
142 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see also State v. Christy Pon-
tiac-GMC, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 17, 19–20 (Minn. 1984) (discussing liability arising from corpo-
rate policy).
143 See L.H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 29–43
(1969).
144 See Mueller, supra note 22, at 40–41; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 explanatory
note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
145 See Brickey, supra note 55, at 626.
146 Cf. ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 143 (1967) (“The larger any organization
becomes, the weaker is the control over its actions exercised by those at the top.” (empha-
sis omitted)).
147 Cf. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 83 (Mass. 1971) (“‘There
are not enough seats on the Board of Directors, nor enough offices in a corporation, to
permit the corporation engaged in widespread operations to give such a title or office to
every person in whom it places the power, authority, and responsibility for decision and
action . . . .’ In a large corporation, with many numerous and distinct departments, a high
ranking corporate officer or agent may have no authority or involvement in a particular
sphere of corporate activity, whereas a lower ranking corporate executive might have much
broader power in dealing with a matter peculiarly within the scope of his authority.
Employees who are in the lower echelon of the corporate hierarchy often exercise more
responsibility in the everyday operations of the corporation than the directors or officers.”).
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criminal action often takes place, corporations will routinely escape
liability.148
While limiting the reach of respondeat superior is surely the whole point
of the inner circle approach it was this too well.  It offers immunity to corpo-
rations that, through neglect or design, manage to keep the upper echelon
in the dark about potential misdeeds.  That is not the sort of structure the
criminal law should incentivize.
B. Collective Knowledge
A minority149 of courts have adopted the doctrine of collective knowl-
edge as a supplement to respondeat superior.  Under this doctrine, a court
will attribute to a corporation anything any of its employees knows.  If one
employee knows A, and another knows B, under the collective knowledge
doctrine the corporation knows both A and B.  The collective knowledge
approach would hold corporations criminally liable even when there is no
single employee with a guilty mental state.
In United States v. Bank of New England,150 a seminal case for the doc-
trine,151 the bank was charged with violating the Currency Transaction
Reporting Act by failing to report cash transfers in excess of $10,000.152
Criminal liability attaches only if the violation was willful, i.e., the Bank knew
about the reporting requirements and specifically intended to commit the
crime.153  Individual tellers separately cashed checks to the same individual
that, when summed, totaled more than $10,000.  Other employees of the
Bank who were not involved in the transactions knew about the require-
ments, but not about the transactions.154  All of the employees were acquit-
ted because none knew both the legal limits and that the transactions
exceeded the limits.155  However, the court upheld the corporation’s convic-
tion using collective knowledge.156
148 See Brickey, supra note 55, at 626 (stating a bit hyperbolically that “a liability rule
requiring proof that a high managerial agent ratified a subordinate’s misconduct is apt to
be, in practice, a rule of no liability at all”).  This will especially be the case if, as some
critics have suggested, the Model Penal Code will encourage corporations to further insu-
late the inner circle from the general operation of the corporation.
149 See Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 134, at 227 (“[O]nly a few courts addressing
criminal or civil issues have alluded to the collective knowledge rule . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
150 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
151 But see Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 134, at 227 (arguing that academics have
misinterpreted Bank of New England and its progeny as endorsing the collective knowledge
doctrine).
152 See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).
153 Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 854.
154 See id. at 856–57.
155 See id. at 847–48.
156 See id. at 856 (“Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the ele-
ments of specific duties and operations into smaller components.  The aggregate of those
components constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation.  It is irrele-
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The collective knowledge doctrine certainly addresses some of the limi-
tations of respondeat superior.  But it is heavily criticized for doing the job
too well, subjecting corporations to liability whenever any employee, no mat-
ter how low ranking, knows something suspicious.157  While these criticisms
do have merit, there is also a respect in which the collective knowledge doc-
trine does not, and cannot, go far enough as a general theory of corporate
mens rea.  It may operate straightforwardly enough for knowledge-based
crimes.  Knowledge is generally understood to be justified, true belief.158
Since all knowledge is true, different things known by different employees
can never conflict.  The process of aggregating their knowledge to attribute
to the corporation is easy—just take the conjunction of all the things known
by employees and say the corporation knows it all.
But there are over one hundred mental state terms and combinations in
the Federal Criminal Code alone.159  The process of aggregating mental
states quickly becomes complex, if not impossible.  Consider crimes where
mens rea turns on the beliefs (rather than the knowledge) of the defendant.
Beliefs, of course, can be false, as in the classic hornbook case of the would-
be murderer who shoots a corpse.160  And they can also be true, as in the
case of knowledge.  So, what happens when different employees have con-
flicting beliefs?  The collective knowledge doctrine provides no answer.
vant whether employees administering one component of an operation know the specific
activities of employees administering another aspect of the operation . . . .”); see also United
States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974) (“[A] corporation can-
not plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several employees was
not acquired by any one individual employee who then would have comprehended its full
import.  Rather the corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of
its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act accordingly.” (citing Steere
Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1963))).
157 See In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 870 F.
Supp. 1293, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 995 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he imputation of
every bit of knowledge known to each individual employee—from the Chief Executive
Officer to the most recently hired recruit—would likely paralyze a corporation as upper
level management attempted to keep informed of all information known to all the corpo-
ration’s employees.”).  Some argue that the collective knowledge doctrine subjects corpo-
rations to criminal liability for mere negligence, for example with respect to maintaining
open channels of communication. See, e.g., Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 134, at 239.
Their proposed plug, only applying collective knowledge “[w]hen a corporation deliberately
structures itself” to prevent the flow of information, id. at 245 (emphasis added), is circular
as a theory of mens rea.
158 See PLATO, Theaetetus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 906–08 (F.M.
Cornford trans., Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961). But see Edmund Get-
tier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1966).
159 Laufer, supra note 59, at 1065.
160 See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 85 (1982) (“Whatever Else It May Be, It
Is Not Murder to Shoot a Dead Body.  Man Dies but Once.”).
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The limitations of the collective knowledge doctrine become even more
intractable for non-epistemic mental states.161  Consider an easy one—inten-
tion.  Philosophers of group agency have rejected attempts to aggregate indi-
vidual intentions in order to decipher group intention.162  In Bank of New
England it is pretty clear that the tellers each intentionally cashed the checks
(say, for $5,500), but it is far from clear how to sum these intentions.  Did the
bank itself intentionally transact over $10,000 for a single client?  Or just
intentionally transact $5,500 for the same client, twice?  The collective knowl-
edge doctrine gives no answer, but guilt or innocence lies in the balance.
Similarly, as with beliefs, intentions can conflict.  If a teller intentionally
fails to file a report, but his supervisor intends to have all transactions
reported, what result?  Again, the collective knowledge doctrine gives courts
no way to answer.  Proponents could adopt some supplemental rule like one
guilty intention is enough, or the more specific intention trumps.  But such
rules go beyond the collective knowledge doctrine, and no one has pro-
posed, let alone attempted to defend, them.  This is perhaps because any
such rule would not be generally applicable.  Whatever rules work for inten-
tion may not work for recklessness, or malice, or any of the hundred or so
mental states phrases that appear in Title 18.
C. Corporate Ethos
The two theories just discussed, like respondeat superior, are “atomis-
tic,” meaning they look to the mental states of individual employees and attri-
bute those to the corporation.  The remaining theories are “holistic.”  They
focus instead on corporations as distinct entities to which mental states can
be attributed directly (even if only as part of a legal fiction).  According to
these theories, attending solely to individuals misses the important impact of
institutional and ad hoc relationships between them.163
Proceeding from the observation that sometimes crime is a predictable
result of membership in certain organizations,164 some theorists propose
looking to corporate culture as a proxy for corporate intent.165  Pamela Bucy
has developed one prominent approach.  According to it, “[t]he government
161 A similar point has been made with respect to “emotional” mental states. See Eli
Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation
Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 668–69 (2000).
162 Cf. Christian List & Philip Pettit, Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result,
18 ECON. & PHIL. 89, 92–96 (2002); Philip Pettit, Groups with Minds of Their Own, in SOCIAL-
IZING METAPHYSICS 167, 167 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003); see also Joan McPhee, Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability and Punishment in the 21st Century: Departures from Constitutional and
Criminal Norms in Practice, 16 NO. 4 ANDREWS’ PROF. LIAB. LITIG. REP. 13 (2006).
163 See Colvin, supra note 21, at 23–24 (“Organizations comprise not only individuals
but also institutionalized relationships among individuals.”).
164 See generally Martin L. Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, Organizational Crime: Two
Models of Criminogenesis, 20 SOC. Q. 517 (1979).
165 See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 136, at 1099; Brent Fisse, The Attribution of Criminal Liability
to Corporations: A Statutory Model, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 277, 279 (1991); Foerschler, supra note
56, at 1304. But see Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
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can convict a corporation . . . only if it proves that the corporate ethos
encouraged agents of the corporation to commit the criminal act.”166  Adju-
dicators can ascertain a corporation’s ethos by looking at its hierarchy, goals
and policies, treatment of prior offenses, efforts to educate employees on
compliance with the law, and compensation scheme.167
Unlike the other holistic approaches to corporate liability, corporate
ethos has garnered some, however modest, attention from lawmakers.  Aus-
tralia, for example, has adopted a version of this theory, allowing prosecutors
to prove intent or recklessness by showing “a corporate culture existed within
the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to noncompli-
ance with the relevant provision.”168  The current U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines also incorporate elements of the ethos approach in determining
sentencing enhancement and mitigation for corporations.169
Bucy’s ethos theory has some of the same limitations as the theories
already discussed.  By its own terms, it can only be used to determine
intent,170 and is inapplicable to crimes with different mens rea elements.
Additionally, some of the elements of Bucy’s model are flatly circular.  For
example, she suggests that intentionally closed channels of communication
may indicate a criminal corporate ethos.171  “Factfinders should ascertain
whether channels of communication are open and effective.  If not, is the
ineffectiveness accidental or planned?”172  But answering that question presup-
poses a separate way of discerning corporate intent.
The ethos theory also has some unique defects.  Bucy turns to ethos in
the search for “a new conceptual paradigm for identifying and proving cor-
porate intent.”173  She thinks that in the context of corporate crime, corpo-
rate ethos “translates into intention.”174  But the corporate ethos Bucy
defines is a measure of propensity to commit crime (i.e., something like char-
acter), not of intent.  As Bucy herself argues, the notion of intent, as distinct
from character, is fundamental to our system of criminal justice.175  Indeed,
the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly prohibit the introduction of charac-
lines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 759–60 (1992) (discussing how courts are reluctant to allow
corporations to escape liability with a well-crafted corporate policy).
166 Bucy, supra note 136, at 1099.
167 See id. at 1101.
168 Crim. Code. Act of 1995, (Cth) s 3 ch 1 div 12.3(2)(c) (Austl.).
169 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(c)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015) (providing sentencing enhancements if a corporation has engaged in “similar mis-
conduct” within the prior decade).
170 See Bucy, supra note 136, at 1181 (“Another valid criticism of the corporate ethos
standard is that it addresses only one of the jurisprudential problems concerning corporate
criminal liability—intent.”); see also Crim. Code. Act of 1995, (Cth) s 3 ch 1 div 12.3(2)(c)
(Austl.) (proving corporate culture as one element of intent).
171 See Bucy, supra note 136, at 1136–37.
172 Id. at 1137 (emphasis added).
173 Id. at 1099.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 1105–13.
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ter evidence: “Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admis-
sible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
with the character or trait.”176  This is because perfectly normal people (nat-
ural and juridical) sometimes commit crimes for which they should be con-
victed.177  And people (natural and juridical) with bad characters sometimes
do bad things just by accident, and should not be convicted.  Bucy’s equation
of intention with character muddles these distinctions.
The heart of this last criticism is that corporate ethos is a much better
measure of causation than of intent.178  Bucy’s own examples are illustrative.
She considers the case of a pharmacy retailer that had errors on reimburse-
ment forms it filed with Medicaid.179  As a result, Medicaid rejected the
forms, and the retailer lost out on reimbursements that were otherwise due
to it.  The retailer was charged with falsification when two employees, without
any direction from higher management, falsified and resubmitted the forms.
According to Bucy, the history of defective form filing is evidence of corpo-
rate intent.  But, while that history is certainly part of the causal chain—with-
out the backlog of denied reimbursements, the employees would have had
no opportunity to falsify them—it seems much more indicative of a stupid
corporation than a criminal one.  In a similar vein, Bucy would take Ford
Motor Company’s “ambitious production and earnings goals” as evidence of
its intent to mislead the government in obtaining an EPA certification.180
But, while causally relevant, it is not so clear why these goals of the corpora-
tion amount to intent rather than competitive drive.  For Bucy, the causal
story is the end of the story.
D. Corporate Internal Decision Structure
Peter French has pioneered a holistic approach to corporate intent that
ties it to the corporation’s internal decision structure (CIDS), i.e., the corpo-
ration’s flowchart and procedural and recognition rules.181  According to
French, the CIDS synthesizes the intentions and acts of individuals within the
corporation into genuine corporate intent.182  “Corporate intent then, is
176 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
177 See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972)
(holding corporation criminally liable when employee acted contrary to direct orders); see
also CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN (1998) (describing how average Germans
came to participate in genocide).
178 Cf. Laufer, supra note 63, at 674.
179 See Bucy, supra note 136, at 1130–31.  She borrows the example from DIANE
VAUGHN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1–16 (1983).
180 Bucy, supra note 136, at 1133.  She borrows this example from Brent Fisse and John
Braithwaite. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE
OFFENDERS 144 (1983).
181 See FRENCH, supra note 19, at 39.
182 See Peter A. French, Integrity, Intention, and Corporations, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 141, 151
(1996).
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dependent upon relatively transparent policies and plans that have their ori-
gins in the socio-psychology of a group of human beings.”183
French’s theory has two primary failings.  First, it only applies to corpo-
rate intent, and as such cannot serve as a general theory of corporate mens
rea.  Second, it rests on a naı¨ve view of corporate governance in which a crisp
flowchart and “transparent policies” necessarily indicate how the corporate
machine decides what to do.  But, as already indicated, corporations are not
always well-oiled machines.  Even if a corporation has an official flowchart
and written policies, the governance reality of a complex corporation is often
much murkier.  Chains of responsibility and authority shift organically in
response to many factors, including changing interpersonal relationships
and individual personalities.  Shortcuts are taken, informal policies are
adopted in the face of changing circumstances, and water cooler politics is
often the real decisional force.  Policies, even clear ones, are frequently just
rough rules that employees may not even know or remember.  As such, they
often tell very little about how a corporation really ended up doing what it
did.
E. The Reasonable Corporation
William Laufer advances a theory that resembles in some respects the
one this Article proposes.  He suggests using indirect evidence of corporate
mental states by having courts ask: “Would an average corporation, of like
size, complexity, functionality, and structure, engaging in an illegal activity X,
given circumstances Y, have the state of mind Z?”184  Laufer’s theory cer-
tainly represents an advance over those previously considered in that it pro-
vides a rubric for any mental state, not just intentions or knowledge.  But, like
some of the others, it cannot serve as a standalone theory.  To apply his test
for corporate mens rea, courts must already know what mental states an aver-
age corporation would have in various circumstances.  And this data point
presupposes an antecedent theory of corporate mens rea.
IV. A NEW TAKE
The theory offered below avoids the limitations of the theories discussed
above.  It is generally applicable to all manner of mental states and any scena-
rio of alleged corporate criminal wrongdoing.  Unlike some of the other the-
ories, it does not presuppose any antecedent theory of corporate mens rea
because it rests heavily on well-developed theories of mens rea for natural
persons.  In doing so, it preserves for the corporate context the tight connec-
tion between punishment and culpability that is central to criminal law’s
expressive goals.185
183 Id. at 152.
184 Laufer, supra note 63, at 701.
185 As such, this Article proposes what Samuel Buell thought was unavailable, a “first-
best rule” for fixing corporate liability. See Buell, supra note 105, at 527 (“Unavailability of a
First-Best Rule[:] Unfortunately, under existing technologies of responsibility assessment,
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A. Criminal Minds
The evolution of corporate liability reflects an abiding assumption that
corporations must be treated differently.186  The key battleground for the
struggle has been corporate mental states.  But it is worth considering
whether this is not just another one of the “many . . . problems with corpo-
rate liability [that] are endemic to U.S. criminal law, rather than unique [to
the corporate context].”187
Ever since American criminal law endorsed the fiction that corporations
can have mental states, it has wrangled with the nagging concern that corpo-
rations do not really have minds.188  As a first step, respondeat superior effec-
tively ignored the problem of corporate mens rea through principles of
vicarious liability.  Next, some lawmakers tried to construct the corporate
mind from the mental states of either the managers (the Model Penal Code
approach) or all employees (the collective knowledge approach).  Still dissat-
isfied academics have pressed the project further, by proposing more sophis-
ticated models of corporate mentality to run parallel to, but always distinct
from, any understanding of the minds of natural persons.  As argued above,
none of these approaches can work as a general theory of corporate mens
rea.
It is time to step back, take stock, and assess the problem free from the
inertia of a history that, by all accounts, has proceeded in an unprincipled
way.189  The American legal system is committed to the personhood of corpo-
rations.190  As such, it is also committed to them having mental states.  This is
there is no optimal means of assessing firm fault.  We do not have the slightest concept of
how one could judge a firm to have committed a crime in the absence of an agent
crime.”).
186 See Lederman, supra note 161, at 649 (“This process [of developing standards for
corporate liability] is accompanied by a change from using ideas aimed at emphasizing the
possible similarities between imposing criminal liability on individuals and the imposition
of such responsibility on legal bodies, toward the formation of constructions underlining
the unique structure of corporations.  Consequently, the issue, in recent years, has moved
away from the notion of adapting the imposition of criminal liability on a human being to
its imposition on corporate bodies.”).  This assumption has persisted, even though it is not
usually present in criminal statutes. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (indicating that “person”
includes corporations unless context indicates otherwise).
187 Beale, supra note 70, at 1482.
188 See Cruz v. HomeBase, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435, 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“Corporations
are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to
injure or deceive.”); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 783 (2012) (“A corporation has no
mind . . . .”); Larry May, Vicarious Agency and Corporate Responsibility, 43 PHIL. STUD. 69,
71–72 (1983) (arguing that corporations have no minds).
189 See Mueller, supra note 22, at 21, 23 (arguing that the law of corporate criminal
liability “has proceeded without rationale whatsoever” and that “[n]obody bred it, nobody
cultivated it, nobody planted it.  It just grew”).  Much non-legal, moral discourse about
corporations is committed to their having the full array of mental states as normal moral
agents. See Colvin, supra note 21, at 24.
190 A corporation is an entity “having authority under law to act as a single person.”
Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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true not only because corporations are liable for crimes, which usually have a
mens rea element.  Within the fiction of the law, corporations also enter into
contracts, buy property, sell goods, and perform all manner of acts implying
they have minds.  It is hornbook contract law that without “the meeting of
the minds of both parties” there can be no contract.191  Entering into such
arrangements is the whole point of creating corporations in the first place.
As a result, lawyers and judges are committed to a legal fiction according to
which corporate mental states permeate the law.  Of course, outside of the
courtroom, these individuals can recognize corporations for the mindless
entities they are, but within the courtroom, corporations can know things,
intend things, be malicious, etc.  The problem courts face is not a metaphysi-
cal one—do corporations have mental states?  The law already tells courts to
proceed as though they do.  Rather, the problem is an epistemic one—how
can adjudicators possibly figure out what those mental states are?
It is over this epistemic question that courtroom fiction and the con-
straints of the real world collide.  If factfinders need to know whether a gun
was used in a crime, the prosecutor can bring it into court and show the
fingerprints on it.  But, even if adjudicators entertain the fiction of corporate
mental states in the courtroom, a prosecutor cannot put a corporate mind on
display.
The more familiar case of demonstrating what mental state a natural
person has may shed light on the problem of ascertaining corporate mental
states.  Unlike with corporate minds, prosecutors can haul natural minds into
the courtroom by summoning the defendant.  But, unlike fingerprints on a
revolver, finders of fact cannot examine a defendant’s mind directly.192  The
most direct access they have is the defendant’s self-report, and even that is
often mediated by the defendant’s self-interest—a very strong incentive to lie,
or at least massage the truth.
And yet the criminal justice system for individuals moves on.  Courts
long ago settled on the only sensible solution to the epistemic problem of
determining what mental states a natural defendant has: allow factfinders to
infer a defendant’s probable mental state from his acts and the circum-
stances in which he was acting.  Thus, in response to a jury verdict challenge,
one court wrote: “[T]he surrounding circumstances, the use of a bottle, the
absence of warning and the force of the blow are facts from which the jury
could reasonably infer the intent to cause permanent disability.”193  And
191 Ins. Co. v. Young’s Adm’r, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 85, 107 (1874).
192 See John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Foreword to SIMON BARON-COHEN, MINDBLINDNESS:
AN ESSAY ON AUTISM AND THEORY OF MIND, at xvii (1995) (“Normal humans everywhere not
only ‘paint’ their world with color, they also ‘paint’ beliefs, intentions, feelings, hopes,
desires, and pretenses onto agents in their social world.  They do this despite the fact that
no human being has ever seen a thought, a belief, or an intention.”); Bucy, supra note 136,
at 1178 (“[D]irect proof of intent is impossible . . . .”).
193 People v. Conley, 543 N.E.2d 138, 143–44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).  Some state legisla-
tures have codified this approach in their rules of criminal procedure. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 307(a) (1987) (“The defendant’s intention, recklessness, knowledge or
belief at the time of the offense for which the defendant is charged may be inferred by the
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such language is the common response when the epistemic problem is
explicitly posed.194  Judicial opinions recite it so rarely because all involved
are familiar with the opacity of other people’s minds and the inferences eve-
ryone must make to determine what others are thinking.  Cognitive scientists
now know that humans have innate and socialized neural mechanisms for
overcoming the problem in everyday life by just the sorts of inferential rea-
soning courts allow.195  And, as argued below, these mechanisms could pro-
vide the basis for a theory of corporate mens rea too.
B. The Psychology of Corporate Blame
If criminal law is to satisfy its expressive aims—to satisfy “society’s desire
to see those [corporations] responsible for misconduct punished”196—it
should reflect the way people actually attribute responsibility to groups.197
Cognitive scientists and social psychologists from the last two decades have
much to say on the topic.  Even though legal scholars recognize the sociologi-
cal fact that humans believe corporate entities can be responsible for wrong-
ful conduct,198 they have paid surprisingly little attention to the more recent
discoveries in cognitive science.
jury from the circumstances surrounding the act the defendant is alleged to have done.”);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(3) (1993) (“The existence of a mental state may be inferred
from the acts of the accused and the facts and circumstances connected with the
offense.”).
194 See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 766 F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Being a state of
mind, willfulness can rarely be proved by direct evidence.  Rather, findings of willfulness
usually require that factfinders reasonably draw inferences from the available facts.” (citing
United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980))); United States v. Stagman, 446
F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1971) (“The general rule in criminal cases is that . . . intent may be
inferred from the totality of circumstances surrounding the commission of the prohibited
act.”); United States v. Vasen, 222 F.2d 3, 8 (7th Cir. 1955) (“[S]cienter may always be
inferred from the proved circumstances, where its asserted lack is based on ignorance of
evidentiary facts which any ordinary person under similar circumstances would be bound
to know.” (citing Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir 1940))).
195 See generally BARON-COHEN, supra note 192; ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, JOINT VENTURES: MIN-
DREADING, MIRRORING, AND EMBODIED COGNITION (2013); SHAUN NICHOLS & STEPHEN P.
STICH, MINDREADING: AN INTEGRATED ACCOUNT OF PRETENCE, SELF-AWARENESS, AND UNDER-
STANDING OTHER MINDS (2003); TADEUSZ WIESLAW ZAWIDZKI, MINDSHAPING: A NEW FRAME-
WORK FOR UNDERSTANDING HUMAN SOCIAL COGNITION (2013); THEORIES OF THEORIES OF
MIND (Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith eds., 1996); UNDERSTANDING OTHER MINDS: PER-
SPECTIVES FROM DEVELOPMENTAL SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE (Simon Baron-Cohen et al. eds.,
2013).
196 Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment Matter?, 19 J.L. & POL’Y
83, 93 (2010).
197 See id. (arguing that criminal law should reflect public perceptions of corporate
punishment); Malle, supra note 110, at 136 (“[T]he law must heed the concepts and crite-
ria by which ordinary people recognize group agents and judge their moral conduct.”).
198 See, e.g., Buell, supra note 105, at 491.
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When groups exhibit high levels of coherence, as do most corpora-
tions,199 humans perceive them as possessing many of the attributes tradi-
tionally associated with individuals.200  Cognitive scientists and social
psychologists call this property of groups “entitivity” (also known by the
tongue-twister “entitativity”), which they define as being “a unified and
coherent whole in which members are tightly bound together” by, for exam-
ple, a collective goal like profit making.201  The shift in human perception of
sufficiently cohesive groups happens at a fundamental level in cognition.202
Research indicates that the human mind represents such groups as unified
entities, rather than as collections of individuals.203  Once this happens,
humans are naturally inclined to make inferences of group-level intentional-
ity behind the groups’ actions,204 rendering “blame and punishment [of]
these groups . . . psychologically sensible and sustainable.”205  As some legal
scholars have observed, the public “perc[eives] that corporations are ‘alive,’
199 Corporations are examples of what social psychologists call “task groups,” which are
relatively high along the spectrum of the sort of coherence at issue. See Brian Lickel et al.,
Intuitive Theories of Group Types and Relational Principles, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
28, 34 (2006) (discussing features of groups that incline people to see them as entitive and
capable of bearing collective responsibility); Brian Lickel et al., Varieties of Groups and the
Perception of Group Entitativity, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (2000); Steven J. Sherman
& Elise J. Percy, The Psychology of Collective Responsibility: When and Why Collective Entities Are
Likely to be Held Responsible for the Misdeeds of Individual Members, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 150
(2010).
200 See David L. Hamilton & Steven J. Sherman, Perceiving Persons and Groups, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 336, 337–41 (1996); Sherman & Percy, supra note 199, at 139–40, 149.
201 Sherman & Percy, supra note 199, at 149–50; see Donald T. Campbell, Common Fate,
Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities, 3 BEHAV. SCI.
14, 17 (1958); Lloyd Sandelands & Lynda St. Clair, Toward an Empirical Concept of Group, 23
J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 423, 453 (1993) (providing “evidence for the existence of group
entities”); see generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP PERCEPTION: PERCEIVED VARIABILITY,
ENTITATIVITY, AND ESSENTIALISM (Vincent Yzerbyt et al. eds., 2004).
202 See Amy L. Johnson & Sarah Queller, The Mental Representations of High and Low
Entitativity Groups, 21 SOC. COGNITION 101, 112 (2003) (providing evidence of a basic shift
in cognition toward groups with high versus low entitivity); Nadzeya Svirydzenka et al.,
Group Entitativity and Its Perceptual Antecedents in Varieties of Groups: A Developmental Perspec-
tive, 40 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 611, 622 (2010) (demonstrating that children also make
assessments about group entitivity).
203 See Marilynn B. Brewer & Amy S. Harasty, Seeing Groups as Entities: The Role of Perceiver
Motivation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION 347, 353 (Richard M. Sorren-
tino & E. Tory Higgins eds., 1996); Sherman & Percy, supra note 199, at 152.
204 See Koichi Hioki & Karasawa Minoru, Effects of Group Entitativity on the Judgment of
Collective Intentionality and Responsibility, 81 JAPANESE J. PSYCHOL. 9 (2010) (finding that peo-
ple are more likely to attribute intentionality and criminal responsibility to groups with
high entitivity).
205 Sherman & Percy, supra note 199, at 156; see Thomas F. Denson et al., The Roles of
Entitivity and Essentiality in Judgments of Collective Responsibility, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GROUP
PROCESSES AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 43, 55–56 (John M. Levine & Michael Hogg eds.,
2006); Anna-Kaisa Newheiser et al., Why Do We Punish Groups? High Entitativity Promotes
Moral Suspicion, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 931, 935 (2012) (arguing that people
are naturally inclined to blame entitive groups for wrongdoing).
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and can act, through their agents, in specific ways.”206  People commonly
speak of corporations “as ‘real’ entities in ordinary language and in moral
discourse.”207
Recent cognitive science indicates that the practice of blaming groups
like corporations closely resembles the practice of blaming individuals.208
Humans the world over see each other’s behavior as situated within an inter-
connected209 causal network of intentions, circumstances, beliefs, and
desires.210  Most judgments of intentionality use a quick, spontaneous cogni-
tive system that operates unconsciously, but humans also have a slower, delib-
erate mechanism that works consciously.211  Both these mechanisms operate
by drawing inferences of intentionality from observed behavior and contex-
tual clues.212  The same mechanisms are in play when humans ascribe mental
states to entitive groups.213  Experiments show that people ascribe intention-
ality to group behavior just as readily as they do to other humans.214  In
doing so, people take the same “intentional stance” toward the group as they
do toward individuals.215
Judgments about the mental states motivating behavior underlie the way
humans assess culpability.216  Humans form these judgments about individu-
als and groups in the same way, and thereby use the same process for deter-
206 Friedman, supra note 85, at 847.
207 Colvin, supra note 21, at 24.
208 See Malle, supra note 110, at 132 (“[G]roup agents can be blamed through the oper-
ation of the same cognitive apparatus through which individuals are blamed.”).
209 See generally JERRY A. FODOR, THE MODULARITY OF MIND (1983).
210 See Malle, supra note 110, at 96, 132–33 (describing a 2010 experiment and conclud-
ing that “both individual and group agents elicited similar and differentiated rates of infer-
ence [of intentionality] . . . and that speed of inferences were also remarkably similar
across agents”); see generally BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR: FOLK,
EXPLANATIONS, MEANING, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (2004); Bertram F. Malle & Joshua
Knobe, The Folk Concept of Intentionality, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (1997).
211 See DENNETT, supra note 107, at 51 (“Although we don’t usually use the method self-
consciously, we do use it self-consciously on those occasions when we are perplexed by a
person’s behavior, and then it often yields satisfactory results . . . . [W]hat we are doing on
those occasions is not switching methods but simply becoming self-conscious and explicit
about what we ordinarily accomplish tacitly or unconsciously.”).
212 See Malle, supra note 110, at 109.
213 See Paul Bloom & Csaba Veres, The Perceived Intentionality of Groups, 71 COGNITION B1
(1999); Austen Clark, Beliefs and Desires Incorporated, 91 J. PHIL. 404 (1994); Malle, supra
note 110, at 107–10, 116 (“[S]ocial perceivers appear to use the same conceptual frame-
work (their folk theory of mind and behavior) for explaining group behaviors as they do
for explaining individual behaviors . . . .”).
214 See Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz, Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies, 7
PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 67, 71–72 (2008); Matthew J. O’Laughlin & Bertram F.
Malle, How People Explain Actions Performed by Groups and Individuals, 82 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 33, 33 (2002).
215 See DENNETT, supra note 107, at 15, 58.
216 See Steve Guglielmo et al., At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology, 52 INQUIRY 449
(2009); Tracy Isaacs, Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective Intention, 30 MIDWEST STUD.
PHIL. 59, 62 (2006); Malle, supra note 110, at 124–30.
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mining whether to blame both.217  To fulfill its expressive aims, criminal law
must be responsive to the human impulse to find corporations culpable, and
to the means by which humans make their culpability judgments.
Lest entitive groups and intention attribution seem like the exclusive
province of cognitive scientists and desert theorists, it bears noting that even
those with a minimal, deterrence-oriented conception of corporate criminal
law must endorse a similar conceptual framework.  Underlying the common-
place thought that sanctions can influence corporate activity are robust
assumptions about the causes of corporate behavior.  If corporations can be
deterred, they must behave as though they have interests or purposes that
they pursue rationally and seek to avoid impediments, like fines, that stand in
the way.  The following is a typical statement reflecting this assumption:
“Since corporations are primarily profit-seeking institutions, they choose to
violate the law only if it appears profitable.”218
If corporate criminal law is to fulfill its expressive aims, it must exhibit
the same sort of sensitivity to circumstance that social practices of judgment
and condemnation do.  As proposed below, one way to do this is to retain the
mediating role mens rea plays between act and conviction.  This can be done
without any deep commitment to the existence of corporate mental states.
But it will require, at a minimum, engaging in a kind of useful pretense
where discourse about corporate mental states can help sort between those
cases where criminal sanction would be expressively appropriate, and those
where it would not.  Philosophers call this kind of pretense, and the dis-
course modeled on it, “fictionalism.”219  Many modern philosophers are fic-
tionalists about all manner of discourse, from math220 to morality221 to
truth.222  In the present context, fictionalism would mean that when lawyers
and judges talk about something like corporate liability, they may not always
aim at the literal truth of the matter.  Rather, they may engage in a kind of
pretense mandated by Congress and state legislatures, presumably because
doing so has some social utility.223
C. A Natural Process for Corporate Defendants
Courts are familiar with adjudicating the mental states of invisible minds.
The real question is why they have had so much trouble determining what
217 See supra note 208.
218 Corporate Crime, supra note 47, at 1365; see generally ROBERT H. BONCZEK ET AL., FOUN-
DATIONS OF DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS (1981); HAROLD L. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1967).
219 Matti Eklund, Fictionalism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jul. 20,
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/fictionalism/.
220 See, e.g., HARTRY FIELD, REALISM, MATHEMATICS AND MODALITY (1989).
221 See, e.g., RICHARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY (2001).
222 See, e.g., ALEXIS G. BURGESS & JOHN P. BURGESS, TRUTH (2011).
223 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[T]he corporate per-
sonality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact.”
(citing Klein v. Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930))).
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corporations are thinking.  It is probably because they have always assumed,
even within the fiction of corporate personhood, that corporations need
some fundamentally different process.  The approach proposed here starts
from the opposite premise, that there is no unique problem of assessing cor-
porate mentality.  As discussed, scientists now know that humans innately util-
ize the same cognitive mechanisms whether attributing mental states to
individuals or to groups like corporations.224  In light of these results, the
supposed need for separate procedures for individuals and corporations is
unmotivated.  There is really only one sort of criminal mind before the
law.225
It bears emphasizing once again that the current proposal is not to per-
sonify the corporate mind in any metaphysical sense.  But analogizing corpo-
rations to natural people could be a useful tool for making sense of
corporate liability within criminal law, given that it is already committed to a
legal fiction of corporate personhood.  As Gerhard O.W. Mueller wrote in a
different context:
Likening a corporation to a natural person for the purpose of criminal law
administration is not [just] an outgrowth of the “psychological tendency
toward personification,” . . . but is a rational interpretation of the theory of
the corporate fiction for purposes of the application of a rational theory of
corporate criminal liability.226
With this premise in place, the present proposal is simple.  Courts
should ask factfinders to do exactly what they have been asked to do for cen-
turies, and what they do every day in their normal social interactions227—
224 See Malle, supra note 110, at 132.
225 This Article is not the first to question the uniqueness of corporate criminal liability.
Sara Sun Beale has emphasized other, pragmatic respects in which problems that confront
corporate liability are shared by individual liability too. See Beale, supra note 70; Sara Sun
Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503 (2007).  The
approach of pressing the parallel between corporate and natural persons has been
embraced, at least in principle, by the Israeli criminal code. See CrimA 3027/1990 Modiem
Constar. & Div. Ltd. v. State of Israel, 35(4) PD 364, 381 (Per CJ Aaron Barak) (Hebrew)
(Isr.) (describing Israeli law as pursuing “a legal norm that requires the existence of
human characteristics might, in principle, apply to a corporation as well”).  But Israeli law
does not get past the Model Penal Code model, see supra Section IV.A, and analogizing
some employees to various organs of the company, see Companies Law, 5759–1999, § 47,
SH No. 1711 (Isr.) (“The actions and intentions of an organ shall be the actions and inten-
tions of the company.”).
226 Mueller, supra note 22, at 41 (quoting Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality,
24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 347 (1911)); see also Am. Med. Ass’n. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233,
253 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff’d, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (“When a corporation is guilty of crime it is
because of a corporate act, a corporate intent . . . . The fact that a corporation can act only
by human agents is immaterial.”).
227 Factfinders may also smuggle their extralegal conceptions of corporate blamewor-
thiness into court.  Psychological studies show that “jurors’ own theories of criminal
responsibility contribute to their verdicts independent of the legal theories of the crime.”
Richard L. Wiener et al., The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification: Predicting When Jurors Diso-
bey the Law, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1379, 1397 (1991); see also Vicki L. Smith, When
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when presented with a set of actions228 and the circumstances within which
they took place, infer which mental state accompanied them.229  This “infer-
ential” approach calls upon courts to abandon the atomistic doctrines of vica-
rious liability,230 and to assess corporations’ mental states by looking at them
holistically.
The inferential approach would be easy enough to implement.  Suppos-
ing the acts and circumstances are not in dispute, the prosecution and the
defense would spin different narratives featuring the corporation as an inde-
pendent agent; these narratives would be tailored to tee up each side’s pre-
ferred mental state inference.231  The court would then ask factfinders to
determine which narrative they find most plausible, keeping in mind ordi-
nary folk-psychological principles, and whether they find it plausible enough
to convict.  Of course, if the acts and the circumstances are also in dispute,
then the process of determining the most likely mental state of the corpora-
tion will be much messier, but such is the ubiquitous challenge of being a
factfinder.
Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 508
(1993) (demonstrating that jurors’ naı¨ve conceptions of criminality influence their ver-
dicts, even in the face of conflicting instructions from a judge).  And even if they do hew
closely to jury instructions, “decision makers will engage in motivated cognition to achieve
their preferred outcomes within the technical constraints of a given law.”  Avani Mehta
Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization Goals, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1324 (2012).  Jurors may not even know they are doing this. See id. at
1346 (discussing “evidence for the nondeliberate nature of this motivated cognition
effect”).
228 This is where the assumption that there already exists a satisfactory theory of corpo-
rate action, see supra Part I, becomes important.
229 There is precedent for extending the ordinary interpersonal inferential mecha-
nisms to fictitious entities. See, e.g., Lisa Zunshine, Theory of Mind and Experimental Represen-
tations of Fictional Consciousness, 11 NARRATIVE 270 (2003) (applying these mechanisms to
discern the mental lives of fictional literary characters).
230 See George F. Deiser, The Juristic Person—III, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 300, 313 (1909) (“The
great materializing tendency will now look straight through the theories—through the
mist, at the people and the facts themselves.”).
231 Legal scholars are just beginning to recognize the centrality of such narratives in the
judicial process. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, Competing Stories: A Case Study of the Role of
Narrative Reasoning in Judicial Decisions, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 99, 100 (2012)
(“I believe that it is not only okay that judges pay attention to stories; it is imperative that
they do so.”); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 291 (2013)
(“Social scientists have . . . demonstrate[d] that jurors make decisions by evaluating com-
peting narratives.”); Diana Lopez Jones, Stock Stories, Cultural Norms, and the Shape of Justice
for Native Americans Involved in Interparental Child Custody Disputes in State Court Proceedings, 5
PHX. L. REV. 457, 463 (2012) (“Litigants tell competing stories to the judge to persuade her
of the legitimacy of each litigant’s version of events.”); Jonathan K. Van Patten, Storytelling
for Lawyers, 57 S.D. L. REV. 239, 252 (2012) (noting the importance of storytelling to court-
room advocacy).
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The inferential approach shares some features with an approach already
codified in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).232  With
the PSLRA, Congress sought to raise the pleading standard for suits brought
pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,233 which generally
proscribes the use of fraud in the sale of securities.234  To be liable under
Section 10(b), defendants must have acted with a mental state embracing
“intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”235  Supplementing the standard
fraud pleading rules,236 the PSLRA requires would-be plaintiffs to “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.”237  To satisfy this hurdle, the Supreme
Court clarified in a suit against a corporate manufacturer that the alleged
mental state “must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing
[mental state] inference.”238  For example, the court must determine that
intent to defraud is at least as likely, given the facts alleged, as “mere motive
and opportunity” to defraud.239
So, courts are already in the business of comparing competing infer-
ences about corporate mental states.  This Article just proposes expanding,
refining, and fleshing out the practice for criminal law.  Courts have long
expressed readiness to do this, even if they have had, until now, no mecha-
nism available for formalizing the inquiry.240
D. Inference in Action
As suggested already, the inferential approach would play out a lot like
the approach currently used for adjudicating the mens rea of individual crim-
inal defendants.  From the perspective of adjudicators and advocates, their
roles would be very similar for both sorts of defendant.  Advocates would
present evidence of circumstances surrounding the corporate act, emphasiz-
ing some, downplaying others, to weave narratives in which their preferred
mental state inferences seem most natural.  Adjudicators would have the age-
232 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
233 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).
234 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
235 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
236 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“[A] party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake.”).
237 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
238 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007); see Fidel v.
Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004).
239 In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
240 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 854 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Will-
fulness can rarely be proven by direct evidence, since it is a state of mind; it is usually
established by drawing reasonable inferences from the available facts.”); United States v.
Wells, 766 F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Being a state of mind, willfulness [of a corporate
defendant] can rarely be proved by direct evidence.  Rather, findings of willfulness usually
require that factfinders reasonably draw inferences from the available facts.” (citing United
States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980))).
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old task of weighing the likelihood of these circumstances, the credibility of
the narratives, and, treating the corporation as a holistic agent, inferring the
mental state they think most likely.
The jury instructions guiding the process could be very similar to those
that courts already use.  The court should first remind the jury that criminal
law engages in a fiction according to which corporations are treated as peo-
ple.241  In California, courts have a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that,
“[u]nder the law, a corporation must be treated in the same way as a natural
person.”242  Following that, something along the lines of New York’s model
instructions for intent would work:
The question naturally arises as to how to determine whether or not a
defendant had the intent required for the commission of the crime.
To make that determination in this case, you must decide if the
required intent can be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven
facts.
In doing so, you may consider the person’s conduct and all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding that conduct.243
Some details of the inferential approach—like specifying the allowable
rules of inference from acts and circumstances to mental states—are not
available, and probably never will be.  This is because it is not at all clear as an
empirical matter that the inferences humans naturally make, whether to indi-
vidual or to group mental states, are governed by generalizable rules.244
Some cognitive scientists think, as a conceptual matter, that there can be no
such rules.245  Fortunately, the law need not specify allowable rules of infer-
ence in order for the current proposal to get underway.  The cognitive archi-
tecture of normal people is already suited to the task, whether or not it is
rule-governed in any formal sense.  Indeed, factfinders already use it, without
241 In California, judges have a sua sponte duty to do this whenever the defendant is a
corporation. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 122 (2015).
242 Id.
243 N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, EXPANDED CHARGE ON INTENT, http://
www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Intent.pdf (last updated Dec. 11, 2000).
244 See ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, SIMULATING MINDS: THE PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND
NEUROSCIENCE OF MINDREADING 10–13, 21 (2006) (arguing largely on the basis of empirical
studies against the theory-theory of mindreading, according to which mental state infer-
ences are governed by theoretical rules).
245 See Jane Heal, Simulation, Theory, and Content, in THEORIES OF THEORIES OF MIND 75,
82 (Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith eds., 1996) (arguing against the theory-theory of
mindreading because of “our inability to say much of a structured or systematic kind about
the central notion of relevance”).  The point is familiar to philosophers—particularists
have long argued that since a fact may favor one conclusion in one set of circumstances,
but the opposite conclusion in a different set, the prospect of providing strict rules of
inference from circumstances to normative conclusions is dim. See generally JONATHAN
DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES (2004); JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON: ON THE THE-
ORY OF VALUE AND ACTION 218–46 (2003) (“The Truth in Particularism”); Jonathan Dancy,
The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics, 66 PAC. PHIL. Q. 141 (1985); Jonathan Dancy, Moral
Particularism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2013), http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/#WhaParBel.
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explicit rules, when trying individual defendants.  To the extent that explicit
rules would be helpful, courts are surely up to the task of providing them as
the body of jurisprudence applying the inferential approach grows.  The
commonsense factors that federal prosecutors consult in determining
whether to charge a corporation are among the factors that will likely be
salient for jurors in determining whether, for example, the corporation
intended to commit a crime or whether it was the victim of a rogue
employee: the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation,
involvement of management, history of similar conduct, the effectiveness of
any compliance program, timely and voluntary disclosure of the wrongdoing,
remedial actions taken, and willingness to cooperate with the investiga-
tion.246  There should be little concern about juries’ ability to cognize these
and like factors; they are already among the considerations used to sentence
corporations.247
An example will clarify the sort of dynamic the inferential approach
envisions.  Consider Regina v. Her Majesty’s Coroner for East Kent,248 in which
the corporation killed nearly 200 people by setting sail with the bow doors
open on one of its passenger ferries.  Applying respondeat superior, the
court acquitted the corporation of manslaughter charges because, after
reviewing the unusually “huge mass of material”249 about the conduct of the
vessel, no individual employee was grossly negligent.250
If the inferential approach were in effect, the case may very well have
shaken out differently.  The prosecution would likely emphasize the two-sen-
tence narrative—the defendant launched its ferry with doors open; hundreds
died when the ferry sank.  Presented with just that narrative, factfinders
would likely infer that the corporation was grossly negligent—how else does a
corporation that runs ferries launch with bow doors open?  The defense
could then seek to complicate the narrative, perhaps trying to introduce evi-
dence of the corporation’s diligence, in general and leading up to the inci-
dent at issue: perhaps the corporation implemented several redundant safety
checks, had a strict safety policy, disciplined its workers for policy violations,
etc.  In light of that competing narrative, factfinders may begin to question
the inference that the corporation was grossly negligent—perhaps an act of
God was at work instead.
Under the actual facts of the case, the defense would have a difficult
time advancing the narrative of diligence since there was ample evidence that
the corporation “was infected with the disease of sloppiness.”251  In light of
those circumstances—setting sail with bow doors open and a track record of
246 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-28.300 (2015), http://
www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations.
247 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2015/2015-chapter-8#8c25.
248 (1987) 3 B.C.C. 636 (Eng.).
249 Id. at 639.
250 Id. at 642.
251 Id.
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sloppy, unsafe behavior—factfinders could very easily infer that the corpora-
tion was grossly negligent in causing the ferry to capsize.  The expressive aims
of the criminal law were disserved in this case by acquitting the corporation.
By opening the possibility of a conviction, the inferential approach is a step
in the right direction.
A different result would also be possible in United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers of California252 under the inferential approach.  Recall that Sun-Dia-
mond was convicted of bribing public officials when its in-house lobbyist
defrauded it to funnel money to his politician friends.253  Under respondeat
superior, the court felt its hand was forced since the employee intended to
bribe the officials, and could conceivably have the mistaken belief that his
employer would benefit thereby.254  But a court applying the inferential
approach would have looked to the surrounding context, notably the lack of
actual corporate benefit and the fact that the lobbyist defrauded Sun-Dia-
mond to effectuate the payments.255  If other factual details supported this
narrative, the inferential approach would have allowed the court to infer that
Sun-Diamond did not intend to bribe officials.  This would vindicate the
overall impression that Sun-Diamond “look[ed] more like a victim than a
perpetrator.”256
At this point, the unique advantage of the inferential approach should
be apparent.  Whatever one’s view about the use of juries in criminal trials,257
their central role for corporate defendants is here to stay.258  That role
should emphasize juries’ competencies, especially where, as for corporate
defendants, jury competence may be particularly suspect.259  The inferential
approach leverages one of juries’ distinctive strengths—distinguishing
whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a guilty mental state is
attributable to the defendant.  In this role, juries can serve as litmus tests, for
corporate as well as individual defendants, of when criminal condemnation
furthers society’s expressive interests.  Respondeat superior and other atomis-
252 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
253 See id. at 964, 970.
254 See id. at 970–71.
255 See id. at 969–70.
256 Id. at 970.
257 See generally Neil J. Vidmar, Empirical Research and the Issue of Jury Competence, 52 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5–8 (1989) (citing relevant articles).
258 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed.”); United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is determined that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees corporate contemnors a jury trial at some level of punishment severity.”);
United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934, 935–36 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding Sixth
Amendment right to jury trials applies to corporate contemnors); United States v. R.L.
Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 379 n.* (6th Cir. 1971) (“[A] corporation [has] the right to a
jury in the trial of a serious criminal contempt.”).
259 See Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 182–91 (1989).
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tic theories never let the jury assess the expressive appropriateness of convict-
ing corporate defendants; the inquiry starts and ends with individual
employees.
E. Limits on the Analogy to Natural Person Defendants
There are limits to the analogy possible between natural person and cor-
porate defendants.  This will necessitate some procedural differences in how
criminal law treats the two.  For example, one obvious disanalogy stems from
the mechanisms individuals and corporations have for gathering information
about their environment.  Humans have five perceptual organs that con-
stantly feed them visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, and gustatory information
about their environment.  Factfinders know very well how these sensory sys-
tems work and may infer, for example, from the fact that a loud bang hap-
pened near a defendant, that he heard it.  Corporations obviously lack these.
But creative development of the inferential approach could allow it to
accommodate these disanalogies while retaining the core benefits of the
view.  For example, the difference in perceptual ability between corporations
and humans masks a deeper similarity between corporations and humans.
Corporations must have some means for gathering information that is impor-
tant for their survival.  Any corporation that lacks them will not be around for
long.  One way of accommodating this fact would be to allow factfinders to
assume corporations know any generally available knowledge that is impor-
tant to their survival.260  This, of course, would be in addition to the inferen-
tial mechanisms already described, allowing factfinders to infer corporate
knowledge from corporate behavior sufficiently responsive to environmental
cues.
F. Deterrence and the Inferential Approach
The main selling point of the inferential approach is its harmonization
with the expressive aims of criminal law.  But the approach should perform
well with respect to criminal law’s deterrence aims as well.  Deterrence theo-
rists will agree that respondeat superior botches that goal, as it does when
applied to the two cases with which this Article began.  In terms of substitute
doctrine, it may be that strict liability would provide the most efficient incen-
tives under conditions of perfect information and where penalties can be
optimally tailored to particular corporations.  But the analysis breaks down
when, as in the vast majority of circumstances, these idealizations are absent.
In the messy real world, the inferential approach should still have robust
deterrent effects.  This is commonsensical.  Few doubt that criminal law for
individuals, with its reliance on mens rea, achieves deterrence.  The only sen-
sible response to a law that proscribes engaging in some conduct intention-
260 Some scholars have already floated a similar proposal. See, e.g., Abril & Olazabal,
supra note 54, at 156–59; see also City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399
F.3d 651, 687 (6th Cir. 2005) (imputing to corporation knowledge of public facts that
entailed a potential “major financial hit”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL509.txt unknown Seq: 40 30-AUG-16 14:26
2088 notre dame law review [vol. 91:5
ally is to try to avoid that conduct, not somehow to try to engage in that
conduct, just unintentionally.  Similarly, if the law penalizes, for example,
“willful” misrepresentations (as opposed to all misrepresentations), corpora-
tions will be incentivized to avoid making misrepresentations.261  And corpo-
rations will likely strive to comply by implementing the sorts of compliance
and response mechanisms that Bucy describes.262  Corporations accused of
crimes could then try to disavow criminal liability by situating their alleged
crime in a broader context of good corporate stewardship, arguing that what
it did looks, at the entity level, more like an unavoidable accident rather than
something done intentionally, recklessly, knowingly, etc.263  To the extent
that criminal law under-penalizes corporations by letting some acts of
unwilled misrepresentation go unpunished, civil law mechanisms are still
available to pick up the slack (though it is not always clear that the slack
should be picked up).264  Strict liability rules are less concerning in that
domain.
Further, there are some unique deterrent advantages to the inferential
approach when the criminal law is viewed more holistically.  Few in the cor-
porate crime literature consider the effects adjustments to the corporate
criminal system could have on criminal law more generally.  But, as Paul
Robinson has pointed out, our criminal law is an integrated whole, and com-
promises in one domain can have ripple effects elsewhere.  In particular, a
criminal legal system that is more responsive to society’s perceptions of
blameworthiness may foster forces, like respect for and confidence in the law,
that ultimately increase compliance by individuals.265  Conversely, ignoring
261 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453,
458 (1997) (“[S]entences based upon desert do provide the opportunity for rehabilitation,
incapacitation, and deterrence.”).
262 See Bucy, supra note 136, at 1153–57, 1160 (“[The corporate ethos standard]
encourag[es] corporations to implement, on their own, prophylactic procedures that
reduce the potential for criminal activity.”).
263 Some scholars argue that the presence of an effective corporate compliance pro-
gram should be a defense to liability. See, e.g., Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate
Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 676 (1995) (“A corporation should be able to defend against vicari-
ous criminal liability by showing that it had a clear and effective policy for complying with
the law in place at the time of the violation, and that the employee’s acts violated that
policy.”).  The approach proposed here would take a more measured stance that avoids
some of the problems the effective-corporate-compliance-program defense faces (e.g., if it
committed a crime, was the compliance program by definition not effective?).  The pres-
ence of a compliance program would be just one of the totality of circumstances finders of
fact would consider in assessing mens rea, albeit one tending to militate against a finding
of guilt.
264 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-28.300.A.9 (2015), http://
www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations
(instructing U.S. attorneys to consider the “adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory
enforcement actions” in deciding whether to prosecute a corporation).
265 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 176–88
(2013) (“[T]he criminal law’s moral credibility is essential to effective crime control.”);
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lay perceptions of blameworthiness in even one area of criminal law, as
regimes of respondeat superior or strict liability inevitably do, threatens to
undermine the broader effectiveness of the criminal law in preventing crime.
CONCLUSION
The current doctrine for adjudicating corporate mens rea—respondeat
superior and its variants—undermines widely recognized aims of criminal
law.  This Article highlighted the disconnect between the outcomes dictated
by respondeat superior and the outcomes consistent with the criminal law’s
expressive aims.  To displace respondeat superior, a new approach to corpo-
rate mens rea should have several features: (1) further the aims of criminal
law; (2) be conceptually coherent; (3) apply generally to all the mental states
that are mens rea elements of crimes; and (4) be easy to implement and
administer.
The inferential approach proposed here, uniquely among the available
alternatives, meets all four requirements.  It begins by recognizing that crimi-
nal punishment is a social practice, fulfilling social values that should reflect
the human socio-psychological nature motivating it.266  The inferential
approach would have factfinders do exactly what they naturally do already
when discerning the mental states of individuals and groups outside of the
courtroom—infer likely mental states from acts and circumstances.  By treat-
ing corporate defendants holistically, the inferential approach would reduce
the current administrative burden of assessing corporate mens rea, which
requires assessing the mental states of all involved employees.267  And since it
would draw on the process and types of inference already used for trying
individual defendants, the inferential approach would be painless to imple-
ment and apply generally to all types of mental states.  Lastly, the inferential
approach furthers the aims of the criminal law better than respondeat supe-
rior.  Because it uses the cognitive mechanisms by which people naturally
assess group responsibility, the inferential approach is particularly apt to ful-
fill the criminal law’s expressive aims.
As a general theory of corporate mental states, the inferential approach
has applications outside the criminal context, wherever corporate mental
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161 (1990) (finding people are willing to obey
the law only if they perceive legal authorities as legitimate); Robinson & Darley, supra note
261, at 454–58, 474–77; see also Maggie Wittlin, Note, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical
Test of Expressive Effects of Law, 28 YALE. J. ON REG. 419 (2011) (discussing effectiveness of
expressive effects of seatbelt laws).
266 Analogous approaches are available in the philosophical literature. See D.E.
Cooper, Collective Responsibility, 43 PHIL. 258, 258 (1968); Marion Smiley, From Moral Agency
to Collective Wrongs: Re-Thinking Collective Moral Responsibility, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 171, 189–90
(2010) (discussing the Aristotelian notion of “moral responsibility”); Deborah Tollefsen,
The Rationality of Collective Guilt, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 222, 226–28 (2006).
267 No fewer than three times, the judge in Her Majesty’s Coroner highlighted the “huge
mass” of evidence required for applying respondeat superior.  R. v. Her Majesty’s Coroner
for E. Kent, (1987) 3 B.C.C. 636, 639, 642 (Eng.).
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states are at issue.  Some of these were mentioned above—for example, tort
law with all the mental states that the negligence inquiry implicates, and con-
tract law, which is premised on a meeting of the minds.  It may also help
illuminate some otherwise puzzling aspects of recent constitutional jurispru-
dence affecting corporations, such as what sense, if any, there is to make of
the notion of a corporation’s sincere beliefs.268  These and related applica-
tions of the inferential approach suggest provocative avenues for future
research.
268 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
